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This article developed out of seven previous trade policy studies: STAFF REP.
COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., COMPETITIVE
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AND THE WORLD BAZAAR (William A. Lovett 1984);
WILLIAM A. LOVETT, WORLD TRADE RIVALRY: TRADE EQUITY AND COMPETING
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES (1987); William A. Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade
Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, I TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 135, 135-89 (1993);
William A. Lovett, Current World Trade Agenda: GA 7T Regionalism, and
Unresolved Asynnety Problems, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001, 2001-45 (1994);
William A. Lovett, World Trade Policies: Limits on Global Integration, in
INTERNATIONAL MARKET CHANGE AND THE LAW (Jukka Mfhonen ed., 1996);
WILLIAM A. LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE
WTO (1999); William A. Lovett, The 1TO: A Train, Wreck in Progress?, 24
FORDHAM INT. L. J. 410, 410-26 (2000). A central theme of these works is the
problem of asymmetries, unequal openness, and differential subsidies. Trading
imbalances have become entrenched. These trade and current account deficits
strain the global trade-finance system. The WTO is ill equipped to cope with such
problems. These flawed arrangements have increased political tensions among
nations.
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INTRODUCTION
In the early to mid-1990s a new liberal world order came together.
Communism collapsed in the United Soviet Socialist Republic
("U.S.S.R") and Eastern Europe. China was moving toward broader
market incentives and decentralization. Europe took big steps at
Maastricht and Amsterdam toward further economic and political
integration, with more market discipline.' Meanwhile, the United
States enjoyed military ascendancy, its economic recovery was
becoming a boom in 1994-1995, and the U.S. dollar regained
strength as the dominant reserve currency.2 Then the Uruguay
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") Round
culminated in the GATT 1994-WTO trade agreements3 signed at
Marrakech, Morocco. Many observers saw in these events a "Grand
Bargain," framing a new confidence in the global marketplace and
euphoria seemed justified, at least for some years.
1. See WILLIAM A. LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, TIIEORY,
AND THE WTO 51-106 (1999) [hereinafter LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY]
(discussing the historical origins of the free trade system throughout the globe).
2. See id. (highlighting the development of the WTO and its role in shaping
U.S. trade policy); see also World Trade Organization Hearing Before the House
Commn. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong. 69-94 (1994) (statement of William A.
Lovett) [hereinafter WTO Hearing] (previewing the debate in 1994 over U.S. trade
policy and what aspects of the U.S. economy were relevant at the time of the
several WTO negotiations); William A. Lovett, A Train Wreck in Progress?, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 410, 410-13 (2000) [hereinafter Lovett, Train Wreck]
(explaining the political and economic circumstances that led to the structure and
framework of the WTO).
3. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF TiIE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 art. XV (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1152 (1994) [hereinafter
GATT 1994].
4. See STAFF REP. COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 98-ri
CONG., COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AND THE WORLD BAZAAR (William A.
Lovett 1984); WILLIAM A. LOVETT, WORLD TRADE RIVALRY: TRADE EQUITY AND
COMPETING INDUSTRIAL POLICIES (1987); William A. Lovett, World Trade
Policies: Limits on Global hItegration, in INTERNATIONAL MARKET CIIANGE AND
THE LAW (Jukka Mfhonen ed., 1996) [hereinafter Lovett, World Trade Policies];
LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 5 1-106; William A. Lovett, Current
World Trade Agenda: GA T7T Regionalism, and Unresolved Asynmetrv Problems,
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001, 2001-45 (1994) [hereinafter Lovett, Current World
Trade Agenda]; William A. Lovett, Rethinking U.S. Industrial-Trade Polic' in the
Post-Cold War Era, I TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 135, 135-89 (1993) [hereinafter
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Developing nations would benefit as the United States, European
Union, and Japan relocated much of their manufacturing to lower
wage countries. Advanced nations would also expand service
activities and investment in poor countries, thus resulting in an
increase in prosperity as well. For five to six years, a broad faith in
the globalization process seemed to encompass most parts of the
world.5  Many emerging and transforming market nations
experienced a rapid expansion of capital flows. Foreign investment
took many forms-expanded multinational corporation ("MNC")
affiliates, intellectual property interests, bank lending, bond issues,
stock purchases, and other direct investments. Most countries hoped
to gain in this general growth of freer trade. Some countries gained a
great deal.6 Americans enjoyed an economic boom. The U.S. gross
national product ("GNP") expanded by more than fifty percent
between 1993-2000, the Dow Jones industrial average more than
tripled, while the NASDAQ ballooned six fold.7
In many developing countries confidence in shared benefits has
eroded. Even among advanced countries, a sizeable dissenting class
questions globalization.' Displaced workers, depressed districts and
cities, disrupted businesses, less prosperous farmers,
Lovett, Post-Cold War Era]; Lovett, TrainI Wreck, supra note 2, at 410-26. See
also WTO Hearing, supra note 2 (highlighting the numerous ways in which the
Uruguay Rounds of the WTO were harmful to U.S. trade policy); Globalisation
and Its Critics: A Survey of Globalisation, ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 2001, at 3, 3-30
[hereinafter Globalisation and Its Critics] (discussing the proponents of
globalization arguments); see also infra Tables 1, 2, and 3 (documenting the
increased size and danger of U.S. trade and current account deficits).
5. See Globalisation and Its Critics, supra note 4, at 3-30 (discussing the pros
and cons of globalization for the rich and poorer countries of the world). Some
argue that the belief that globalization actually brings work and money to poorer
countries is true. Id. at 10-13.
6. See Lovett, Train Wreck, supra note 2, at 410-11 (noting the role of the
asymmetrical and non-reciprocal benefits that come to MANCs due to
globalization).
7. See LOvETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 3-15 (including a chart
of the U.S. GNP covering a period from 1961-1998).
8. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (expressing many doubts and
protests against the negative consequences of globalization); see also
Globalisation and Its Critics, supra note 4, at 3 (commenting that to a minority,
globalization is representative of a force for "oppression, exploitation, and
injustice").
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environmentalists, and the insecure want to cut back on
globalization, to set limits, and/or provide stronger safeguard relief 9
9. See LAWRENCE MISHEL & DAVID M. FRANKEL, TIHE STATE OF WORKING
AMERICA (biennial series 1994-2001) (discussing life of the American worker and
its effect on economic policies and conditions); BENNETT HARRISON & 13ARRY
BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TURN: CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND Till'
POLARIZING OF AMERICA 21-52 (1988) (discussing the de-industrialization of
America and how former President Reagan's economic policies damaged the
American standard of living); BACK TO SHARED PROSPERITY: THE GROWING
INEQUALITY OF WEALTH AND INCOME IN AMERICA (2000) (compiling the essays of
several economic, political, and social scholars who discuss the effects of the
growing income of inequality in the United States); see also Globalization s Last
Hurrah?, 128 FOREIGN POL'Y 38, 46 (2002) (ranking economic, social,
technological, and political integration levels in sixty-five countries); Allen Breed,
Textile Industy Repeats a Common Cycle: Go Where the Labor is Cheaper,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 5, 2002 (describing a brochure of pictures and articles
published depicting textile mills allegedly forced to be shut down by
modernization and globalization); Raymond Colitt, Serious Ideas Behind the
Theatrics: World Social Forum: Anti-Globalisation Lobby Hias Recovered Its
Momentum, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at 14 (commenting on the anti-globalization
movement and a proposal for a forum for exchange of ideas); James Harding,
Globalisation's Children Strike Back: As the IMF, World Bank and the WTO
Brace for Huge Protests Against Free Market Capitalism. James Ilarding
Uncovers the Workings of the Anti-Globalisation Movement, FIN. TIMES, Sept. I I,
2001, at 14 (noting the background of several individuals who intended to
participate in the protests of the WTO meetings in Washington); Robert Guy
Matthews, U.S. Industry Leaders Have Mixed Views About A New Round of WTO
Talks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2001, at 2 (highlighting the U.S. industrial leaders'
viewpoints about the upcoming WTO round, stating that supporters feel it can
create a more level playing field for the developing world while critics argue that it
will hurt U.S. industries); Paul Craig Roberts, Trading Away Our Living
Standards, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at A21 (discussing the various strides that
have been made in corporate society because of globalization, but noting that the
United States' three largest trade deficits resulted also from globalization). Roberts
argues that the United States cannot make its own clothing, vehicles, or oil. Id. See
also Philip Stephens, A Poor Case for Globalisation, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2001, at
15 (discussing the call of the protestors similar to those in Seattle in Autumn 1999
who want a fairer capitalism and one that does not exploit the poor at the expense
of the rich); Philip Stephens, The Choice for the Superpower: The Global Backlash
Against International Economic Integration Will Resume and Present the U.S.
With a Dilemma, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2001, at 21 [hereinafter Stephens, Choice
for the Superpower] (describing the mounting protect against globalization).
The real and complicated problem (understood in the GATT 1947 agreement)
is what limits, offsets, and safeguards are desirable for the global economy.
Unfortunately, important aspects of the GATT 1994-WTO arrangements have
proven to be seriously misguided blunders in retrospect. See Lovett, Train Wreck,
supra note 2, at 411 (arguing that the GATT 1994-WTO regime created insecurity
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Many emerging market nations boomed for a while. A growing
parade of financial-devaluation crisis followed this boom in countries
such as Mexico, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, Russia,
Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Turkey, Argentina, and others, which
gradually undermined enthusiasm about the blessings of unrestricted
capital inflows and complete openness.'0 Then caution and renewed
mercantilism replace the great faith in "hands off" total market
freedom for trade in goods, services, and finance. " Meanwhile, many
other nations in Africa, the Mid-East, and the former U.S.S.R., never
received adequate new capital inflow and remained stagnant or
worse. The "Grand Bargain" did not work that well for them, and
many countries and interests now feel shortchanged.
Suddenly, on September 11, 2001 ("September 1 1th"), as the
United States and global economy slowed markedly, terrorist
bombings occurred at the U.S. World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. The United States found itself at war. Quickly these
bombings were traced to Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the
Taliban in Afghanistan. A broad coalition of nations expressed
support for the United States. Significant U.S. Air and Naval Special
Forces deployed to the Arabian Sea, the Turkestans, and Pakistan.
Soon the United States launched air strikes against Taliban-al-Qaeda
(Osama Bin Laden) targets, and U.S. forces helped the Northern
Alliance and other Afghan dissidents to overthrow the Taliban. The
United States worked for a more "responsible" government in
Afghanistan.1 2 Meanwhile, the United States created new defense
and emergency outlays. Homeland defense measures include
increased airport security, public health safeguards, immigration
control, partial call-up of reserves, larger air and naval spending, aid
for the lives and aspects of industrial workers, farmers, and business enterprises).
10. See infra notes 45-51 (discussing in depth the wave of financial crisis
around the world).
11. See Stephens, Choice for the Superpower, supra note 9, at 21 (discussing
ways in which policy makers will begin to act in response to the slowing economy
and toward any type of an Argentinean-type situation).
12. See Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment. and War, 115
HARV. L. REv. 1217, 1217-24 (2002) (outlining a chronology of events for
September 11 th and the aftermath).
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to new allies, World Trade Center reconstruction, and some bail-out
financing for distressed sectors of the economy. 3
In the world economy, a shock wave of increased risk, slowed
trade and foreign investment, reduced travel and tourism, and tighter
consumer spending in some sectors, brought a global slowdown, at
least temporarily. How quickly could things recover? Most observers
now agree that substantial new uncertainties, security dangers, and
disruptions will afflict the global economy in 2002-2004, and
perhaps beyond.
14
13. See Hans Binnendijk & Richard Kugler, Sound Vision, Unfinished
Business: The Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001, 26 FLETCHER F. WORL)
AFF. 123, 123-28 (2002) (noting the various increased security measures taken
since September I 1th and its costs to the U.S. economy, both politically and
monetarily).
14. See Gerard Baker & Quentin Peel, Anxious World Reflects on a Murky
Picture: Economic Uncertainty and Political Insecurity Will Preoccupy the World
Economic Forum in New York This Week, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, at I
(describing how the attacks in the United States on September Ilth not only
affected the U.S. economy, but also the global economy); Ed Crooks, Global
Prospects: All Eyes on U.S. to Lead Recoveiy, FIN. TIMES. Feb. I, 2002, at II
[hereinafter Crooks, Global Prospects] (reporting that even if the United States
does recover strongly this year and into the next, threats to derail its momentum
still exist). Crooks warns, however, of actions that could threaten the economic
recovery. Id. For example, the risk of dollar devaluation if there is a bad U.S.
current account of deficiency. See Crooks, Global Prospects, supra, at II. He
notes that, "[a] dollar crash, accompanied by a further slump in stock prices and
other U.S. assets, would be such a grim outcome for the U.S. and the rest of the
world that there is a general interest here in ensuring that faith in the future of the
U.S. is maintained." Id. Ed Crooks & Richard Waters, World Economic Upturn
Likely To Be Weak, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at 7 (characterizing financial and
market analysts' mood as optimistic regarding the upswing of the U.S. economy
but that recovery would be slow); Greg Ip & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Did Greenspan
Push His Optimism About the New Economy Too Far?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28,
2001, at I (discussing the impact of Chairman Greenspan's push for rapid
productivity growth and rising living standards as the new economy and its
possible effects on interest rates in 2002); Joseph Kahn, The Worlds Economies
Slide Together Into Recession, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at AI (noting that the
world is experiencing a recession not seen for over two decades and that this
recession may have been the consequence of increased economic integration).
Further disruptive news to foreign confidence in the dollar could come from
renewed U.S. fiscal deficits, Enron repercussions, political gridlock and
divisiveness, or less fortunate military campaigns than that against Afghanistan. Id.
See also Ronald McKinnon, Spend Now, Pay Later: George W. Bush s Budget
Risks Widening the US's Balance of Payments Deficit, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at
[ 17:951
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Does this mean the global economy experiment failed? Was it all
an illusion? Not exactly. There is a need for realism. It is also crucial
to think together about trade, finance, and security. Sound financing,
reliable trade flows, and adequate security arrangements go together
in the global economy. A breakdown in security clearly imperils
trade and finance. Strained trade-finance thus undermines security, at
least in those countries most badly affected by failing economies and
widespread suffering.' 5
Now the trade regine suffers from excessive rigidities, structural
trade imbalances, and insecurities. Unconditional most favored
nation ("MFN") status worked well enough between 1947-1967 to
reassure nations fearing a U.S. lead in technology and industry. By
the early 2000s, however, almost all countries needed more
reciprocity and shared benefits. Until recently, the finance regime
seemed to be in better shape. Floating exchange rates, International
Monetary Fund ("IMF") assistance, and global capital markets
provide "flex." Nevertheless, excessive speculation, hot money
flows, and devaluation crises were disruptive. Many complained that
poor countries needed more financing.16 Yet, the poor nations
typically lack responsible governance, secure property,
15 (describing President Bush's budget as a fiscal shock that is likely to result in a
federal budget deficit). Unlike other federal budget deficits that have resulted in
inflation due to the Greenspan federal reserve, the more likely result will be a rise
in U.S. foreign debt. Id. It is also worth remembering the two major episodes of
U.S. dollar decline, i.e., 1968-1971 and 1975-1980. In both cases the United States
suffered defeats in the Cold War, U.S. budget discipline was weak, U.S. inflation
increased, and the United States experienced balance of payments problems. U.S.
external deficits have been much worse between 1995 and 2002, but U.S. fiscal
discipline was good and inflation low. In 2002, however, signs of renewed political
gridlock and potential fiscal deficits appeared. See Gerard Baker, Reaganomics
Returns: George W. Bush's Budget Is Reminiscent of the Strategy That Led to
Imbalances in the Economy During the Reagan Years, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002, at
10 (comparing the economic policy years during the Reagan Administration to the
proposed budget and economic plan of President Bush).
15. See William A. Lovett, A Grand Bargain or Grand Illusions? Trade,
Finance and Security Challenges, Address Before the 11 th Annual Meeting of the
International Trade and Finance Association ("ITFA") (Nvfay 28, 2001) (linking
strains in the three legs supporting the global economy: trade, finance, and
security).
16. See Globalisation and Its Critics, supra note 4, at 10 (stating that capital is
scarce in the developing world and that openness to foreign trade and investment
should help encourage flow to poor economies).
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infrastructure, and education. 17 More money, investment, and trade
could help, but also needed is the establishment of effective security
and governmental responsibility, meaning that there needs to be a
renewed emphasis on a healthy security regime. Corrupt and failing
regimes, thuggery, and terrorism are serious problems. In the early
post-Cold War euphoria, a major draw down in military force levels
(between 1991-2001) seemed reasonable for the Western-style
democracies. By early 2002, unfortunately, the world looked less
safe. Challenges to security afflict many parts of the world. The Mid-
East, some of Latin America, parts of the former U.S.S.R., some of
the Balkans, much of Africa, and borderlands around China and
India, had become insecure. Now the United States suffers from a
continuing threat of terrorism.
In this context, the Doha WTO trade negotiation round was
launched. 18 Unquestionably, the new September 11 th global security
threats helped nudge the world's leading trade powers into papering
over differences, and into accepting a limited agenda of WTO
negotiations for the next few years. Realistic observers, however,
emphasize the largely "defensive" character of world trade
bargaining now. 19 Keeping things together, not getting hurt, and not
17. See Adam Hersh, Limits to Free Trade, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2001, at
A46 (criticizing the World Bank and IMF for providing poor countries with the
false hope that globalization and free trade will solve their poverty problems when
it will take much more to bring citizens of poor countries above the poverty line).
18. See Peter Riddell, Far From the Headlines, The World Is Changing, TIM[iS
(LONDON), Nov. 19, 2001, at 16 (discussing the importance of the Doha Round of
the negotiations and stating that the negotiations have taken on new significance
after September 11 th due to an increased desire to fight back against terrorists who
reject globalization).
19. See Frances Williams, WTO Members Agree Talks- Procedure, FIN. TiMEs,
Feb. 2, 2002, at 6 (noting that WTO members agreed on a procedure five days later
than planned for upcoming negotiations designed to facilitate participation of'
poorer nations); Graham Searjeant, A Pointless Breakthrough in Doha, TIvlEs
(LONDON), Nov. 16, 2001, at 26 (arguing that the Doha negotiations, characterized
as one for developing countries, is really not accomplishing its stated goals).
Searjeant explains that for every gain for a poorer country, the European Union or
some other industrialized country is gaining a new limitation or exception. Id. See
also Hersh, supra note 17 (criticizing the World Bank and the IMF for making
false promises regarding globalization and free trade on poorer nations); Guy de
Jonquieres & Frances Williams, Moore Spells Out Dangers of Failure at WTO
Talks, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at 13 (noting the warning given by WTO
Director-General Mike Moore that if the Doha talks failed, the global system of
[ 17:951
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allowing trade and finance-security relations to unravel are the
overriding objectives.20
Big breakthroughs in further trade-openings for newly
independent countries ("NICs") and lesser developed countries
("LDCs") are not in the cards. There is a need for efforts to keep
trade flowing in the more open Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") member countries, and to
contain WTO disputes. -1 Some work can be done at the multilateral
WTO level, but most work must occur bilaterally among the leading
trade blocs (i.e., United States, North American Free Trade
Association ("NAFTA"), European Union, Japan, China, Russia,
Association of South East Asian Nations ("ASEAN"), Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC"), and the IMF). Bilateral
relations are increasingly crucial in a slowed global marketplace, as
free trade would crumble into a myriad of regional trade agreements); Guy de
Jonquieres, New Battles Loon After WTO Success at Doha, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 1,
2002, at 3 (describing the sense of accomplishment felt at Doha because not only
had the Round been free from the "strain of Seattle," but the aftermath of
September 11 th also fostered a spirit of unity).
20. See James Toedtman, Econon, IHatch: Brave New H'orldfor International
Trade, NEWSDAY, Dec. 30, 2001, at F2 (noting that Robert Zoellic, a top U.S. trade
negotiator, managed to get House approval from Trade Promotion Authority,
which based part of its approval on public support for globalization and economic
growth after September 1 1th); Democrats For Povert', WASiH. POST, Nov. 18,
2001, at B6 (stating that U.S. Democratic leaders did not rush to give the executive
trade promotion authority for the WTO summit, even though it would mean that
issues combating world poverty would be addressed). The article states that this
would also mean that U.S. anti-dumping legislation might have been discussed and
that Democrats were not willing to risk the injury that might be caused to U.S.
industries if anti-dumping laws were taken away. Id. See also G. Ganapathy
Subramaniam, The Declaration for TRIPs and Public Health Is Biggest Trophy for
India, ECON. TIMES (NEW DELHI), Nov. 18, 2001 (discussing India's activities in
increasing its position in the global trading community after the Doha talks due in
part to India's Union Commerce and Industry Minister Murasoli Maran), available
at http://economictimes.indiatimes.comarticleshow.asp*?artid= 197826820&s
Type=1 (last visited March 8, 2002).
21. See Helene Cooper, Poorer Nations WVin Gains in Global Trade Deal as
U.S. Compromises, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2001, at I (noting that the European
Union and the United States made more concessions than expected, but
concessions for individual members on special concerns were more troubling);
Geoff Winestock & Helene Cooper, WTO Envoys Agree to Ease Access to Key
Drugs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2001, at 17 (stating that the \WTO negotiations had
succeeded in creating a deal whereby poor countries could import and export
generic drugs despite patents held by drug companies).
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most nations struggle to restore and safeguard reasonable economic
growth.2 2  Meanwhile industrial surpluses, discounting, and
"dumping" will get worse in many sectors. Thus, trading conflicts
will liven up even more in the coming years. This need not imply a
"breakdown" in the global economy. Nobody wants that much
disruption. Most countries, however, no longer trust pure market
forces or unrestricted "neo-liberalism" as the optimal solution for
their national economies or world affairs.
Unavoidably, perhaps, this means that international trade
investment finance will become somewhat more "political" and less
"tidy" in a free market sense. The Japanese, much of the European
Union, and most developing countries have always been comfortable
with partial government influence or sponsorship in trade-finance
relations. In contrast, the United States tends to idealize a more
"hands off' global marketplace, at least since the 1960s.13 Some
quickness and efficiencies flow from the U.S. approach. Successful
industrial challenges from Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asia, and
China show, however, that the U.S. model is not necessarily the only
alternative. Unfortunately, the growing sense of crisis, strain, and
vulnerability for many countries in the later 1990s and early 2000s
means that global competition requires more counter-sponsorship (in
many ways) from the U.S. government to ensure that U.S. companies
and interests get their fair share of global markets. Any serious,
unbiased observer of the globalization controversy must appreciate
the substantial erosion of "neo-liberalism" and unrestricted faith in
free world markets. However, also undermined are "crony
22. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 199
(4th ed. West 2002). A slowed, uneven global marketplace, with significant
imbalances, dangers of excess capacity, and increasing competitive pressures is
more like the GATT 1947 environment than the free markets euphoria, emerging
markets boom, and faith in globalization of later 1993-1995 (when the GATT 1994
agreements crystallized). Meanwhile, since the mid-1970s the creation of almost
two thousand bilateral investment treaties has improved trade-investment relations.
Now the United States has more than thirty of these relationships and the list is
growing under the Bush administration. Id. See also infra note 83 and
accompanying text (discussing the four main reasons the WTO system is flawed).
23. See JAMES SHOCH, TRADING BLOWS: PARTY COMPETITION AND U.S.
TRADE POLICY IN A GLOBALIZING ERA (2001) (providing a comprehensive and
objective assessment of recent U.S. trade policies during the Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton Administrations).
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capitalism" and heavier-handed statism. This leaves a middle zone of
centrist respect for stronger accountability, healthy market forces,
transparency, intelligent use of government stimulus, safeguarding,
redeployment, and measures that can improve the industrial-trade
performance of most nations. A challenge to the IMF, World Bank,
and the new WTO is to play skillful, facilitative roles, and not
interfere with successful governments and sound economic-industrial
performance. People will expect their national governments to
deliver reasonable economic growth, broadly shared prosperity, and
modest inflation.2'4 How much of a role should be played by U.S.
trade law remedies, like countervailing duty proceedings against
dumping or foreign subsidies? What about Section 337 actions
dealing with intellectual property, Section 301 proceedings, or WTO
complaints by the U.S. against foreign governments'? Those wanting
an elimination of all such "trade intervention" activities proved to be
unrealistic. In fact, U.S. merchandise trade and current account
deficits have increased substantially since the GATT 1994-WTO
agreement. Ironically, the U.S. dollar became stronger in recent
years, as well.25 How much longer can these asymmetries, trading
imbalances, and high dollar value continue?
U.S. trade policy leaders need to catch up with public attitudes. -6
The majority of Americans have long favored a reciprocity approach
to freer trade as opposed to unilateral or one-way freer trade. In
1999, only twenty-eight percent believed that "[t]he U.S. should
24. See generally ALFRED ECKES, JR., OPENING AMERICA'S MARKI~S (1995)
(discussing the overall history of U.S. trade policy and ways in which the U.S.
government sought to balance as many of its interests as possible, while managing
to avoid diminishing benefits of free trade).
25. See infra Tables 1, 2, and 3 (charting various values, including current
account deficit, GNP, gross federal debt, and trade balances with different
regions).
26. See Leo Ceodrowicz, Heavy Breathing on a Trade Crusade: Running With
the FT: Pascal Lamny, the Workaholic EU Trade Commissioner, Maintains a
Frugal and Disciplined Daily Routine, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001, at 3 (describing
the routine of Pascal Lamy and his success at the Doha Round). Lamay used two
aspects from the WTO discussions in Seattle to his advantage in the Doha Round:
(i) realizing that with consensus based decision-making one needs the support of
the developing world, which commands two-thirds of WTO membership; and (ii)
listening to questions raised by anti-globalization protestors to understand what
issues and concerns needed to be addressed. /d.
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lower its trade barriers even if other countries do not," whereas sixty-
nine percent felt "[t]he U.S. should only lower its barriers if other
countries do."27 Similar outlooks can be traced back to the 1940s and
1950s.28 To be sure, U.S. Cold War trade policies allowed unequal or
asymmetrical openness as a strategy of "trade not aid" to support
allies in Europe, Asia, and other parts of the world.29 However, when
slumps and extensive job losses threaten broad American prosperity,
the public naturally turns against global integration that does not
deliver general prosperity.30 Other countries reason the same way.
I. STRAINS IN THE TRADE REGIME
The GATT 1994-WTO trade regime has three major
characteristics: (i) extensive asymmetries or unequal openness,
entrenched by the WTO's Dispute Resolution process; (ii) strong
conservative momentum with little incentive for favored "protected"
interests (free riders) to open themselves up or to equalize import
access; and, (iii) voting in the WTO that relies mainly upon "one
country one vote" (i.e., United Nations General Assembly voting
style), so that the great majority of developing countries need not
yield to pressures for greater reciprocity from nations that may be
losing net market shares, real incomes, or jobs to "emerging
nations."'" Tragically, however, the crucial 1991-1993 Uruguay
27. KENNETH F. SCHEVE & MATTHEW J. SLAUGHTER, GLOBALISATION AND TIlE
PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN WORKERS 16 n. 1 (2001)
28. See id. (2001) (documenting that in 1946 only thirty-five percent of
Americans responded that it would be good if the United States reduced its tariffs
on goods bought from other countries).
29. See LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 4 (recounting U.S.
"trade not aid" policies that allowed generous aid to its allies and trading partners).
30. See Globalisation and Its Critics, supra note 4, at 3-5 (summarizing public
attitudes towards globalization where loss of employment and profits occur).
31. See LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note I, at 10-11 (outlining the
characteristics of the GATT 1994-WTO regime). The WTO's voting structure is
greatly flawed. See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 96-97
(1990) (analyzing the problem of a possible WTO voting structure). Jackson
outlined a voting structure as an assembly (one vote per member), plus a smaller
"executive council." Id. at 96. Jackson stated:
The OTC draft [19553 provided for an executive committee of 17 members,
elected by the assembly but always including the five most economically
important members and representatives varying levels of development, types
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Round Negotiations failed to implement reasonably weighted voting
and decision-making policies. This contrasted dramatically with the
IMF, which adjusted its weighted voting system skillfully in the
early to mid-1990s in an effort to accommodate China, India, Russia,
and Saudi Arabia with Executive Board representation equal to that
of the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and France,
along with adjusted country quotas that reflect economic strength
and population. 
3 2
Sadly now, the dominant WTO voting procedure is "one country
one vote," such that developing countries have more than three-
fourths of the WTO's one hundred and forty-four country voting
membership, and the European Union ("EU") is another voting
majority (with fifteen members, another fifteen to twenty EU
candidates, and roughly sixty-five to seventy Lom6 Convention
states).33 This played out in the recent logjam of conflicting proposals
for another WTO round of trade negotiations, and the voting
structure limits much change in "multilateral" trading relations.
According to "bicycle theory" advocates, however, MNC interests
want to "keep full control" of trade negotiations so that no general
unraveling or widespread relapse into "protectionism" might occur.'
of economies, and geographical areas. This structure tries hard to avoid the
problems of the extremes of one vote per nation, on the one hand, and a
"consensus system" that can result in a virtual veto ... on the other hand. One
way to do this is to explicitly recognize some effective economic power
differences among nations (the IMF and World Bank use a weighted voting
system), but to do so in a way that prevents the powerful from having "unfair"
influence. Without such recognition, however, major powers are unlikely to
comply... with norms of one vote per nation system.
Id. Jackson's study is widely considered among trade experts as the most important
single inspiration for the current WTO. Id.
32. See LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 173-77 (analyzing the
voting structure in the IMF by charting various directors and their total votes in
comparison to their percentage of the total fund); see also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & THE WTO 407 (2000) (noting the potential problem
of bloc voting and discussing what risks that might entail for the United States).
See LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 10 (discussing the WTO voting
structure).
33. See LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 10 (discussing the WTO
voting structure).
34. See Lovett, Train Wreck, supra note 2, at 415 (discussing the "'bicycle
theory" employed in the 1980s and early 1990s that justified free trade and MNC
control over the multilateral trade agenda despite "'mistakes and weak
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A big complication, however, is the very large, U.S. "structural"
trade and current account deficit problem.3 5 For more than twenty
years, the United States has run large external deficits, totaling more
than $3,600 billion of merchandise trade deficits and $3,100 billion
in current account deficits. Annual U.S. trade-current account
deficits exceeded four percent of U.S. gross domestic product
("GDP") in 2000-2001.36 Extraordinary U.S. external deficits of this
magnitude are not sustainable over the long run.37 Recent tolerance
by the global economy is reflected in two factors: (i) continued
dominance of the U.S. dollar as a primary reserve in the 1990s; and
(ii) enjoyment of the U.S. bull market (and somewhat higher U.S.
interest rates) by the EU, Japan, and other OECD, NIC, and LDC
investors as a parking place for investment resources (at least
between 1993 and 2000). Now that the U.S. stock market and
economy slumped substantially, the European Monetary Union's
("EMU") euro might better challenge the dollar's dominance. As the
European Central Bank ("ECB") held its interest rates steadier in the
spring of 2001, deeper interest rate cuts by the U.S. Federal Reserve
brought short-term U.S. rates below EU rates. Thus, a more equal
euro challenge should develop in the coming years.38
compromises" in the Uruguay GATT round).
35. See infra Tables 1, 2, and 3 (documenting the current account deficits and
level of international transactions over the past forty years).
36. See Crooks, Global Prospects, sup-a note 14 (reporting the U.S. current
account deficit remains at four percent of GDP).
37. See Lovett, Train Wreck, sup-a note 2, at 420 (warning that the United
States cannot continue to live beyond its means in light of its trade and current
account deficits).
38. See id. at 424 (considering whether the euro is strong enough to provide
comparable reserve currency to replace the U.S. dollar). See also C. RANDALL
HENNING & PIER CARLO PADOAN, TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES ON TIlE EURO
5-63 (2000) (discussing the origins of the euro and highlighting the interplay
between the U.S. and European economies). The EMS made steady progress
between 1998 and 2002. Id. at 95-100 (explaining the role of the EMS as a
coordinating device for exchange rates). In the spring of 1998, prospects for the
euro and EMS remained uncertain because of difficulties in reducing budget
deficits, social insurance, and chronic under-employment. /d. More recently,
however, the Stability and Growth Pact and later 1990s prosperity helped to cut
EU budget deficits and reduce unemployment. /d.
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Optimists believe that a "soft landing" for the dollar in the U.S.
economy is achievable.3 9 Not only could U.S. industry stock and
markets recover gracefully without much jolting or disruption, but
excessive U.S. trade and current deficits might also ease gradually.
The euro, many say, is not strong enough yet as a rival capital market
to seriously challenge the over-valued dollar for some years at least.'"
Observers hope this gives enough time for current U.S. trading
imbalances to work themselves down slowly and relatively
painlessly." This would be greatly preferred to serious disruptions."
But U.S. growth performance could weaken, slowed by partisan
bickering and fiscal gridlock, and/or by a diversion of foreign
investment to other markets (e.g., the euro area). Renewed security
problems could develop over the Persian Gulf, North Korea, Taiwan
Straits, Colombia, and the Panama Canal. Conflict between Israel
and the Palestinians seems intractable to many observers. Terrorist
attacks have become disruptive and worrisome. Natural disasters
have hit some areas (earthquakes, heavy flooding,
hurricanes/typhoons, harvest failures, volcanic eruptions, and
plagues). Meanwhile, escalated U.S. and/or EU political tensions,
rivalries, and uncoordinated economic policies might allow
39. See Lovett, Train Wreck, supra note 2, at 420 (outlining the four camps of
U.S. economic growth and stock market wealth). These four camps are divided as
follows: "(1) Onward and upward at unusually high growth rates say the most
optimistic, with faith in the Internet, faster growth, and the unique virtue of U.S.
capitalism; (2) A soft landing with slowed growth, but no recession, is the hope of
many... (3) Unstable stagnation ... and (4) Crunch and slow recovery." Id.
40. See id. at 424 (recounting experts' opinions that the euro will not be strong
enough to replace the U.S. dollar as reserve currency).
41. See id. (commenting on optimistics' hopes that U.S. trading imbalances
will recover without any major repercussions).
42. See infra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of full
appreciation given to U.S. trade-current account deficits); see also Wanted: S2
Billion a Day, EcONOMIST, Feb. 14, 2002 (arguing that the level of current account
deficits today cannot exist for much longer, likening the effect of the realization of
the deficit to an impending doom on the economy). Is there any guarantee that
increased U.S. external debt loads (about S2,700 billion or twenty-seven percent of
U.S. GDP) and very large U.S. trade and current account deficits (now S400 billion
annually, and totaling more $3,000 billion since the early 1980s) cannot cause a
loss of confidence in the U.S. stock market? What if EU, Japanese, NIC, and LDC
portfolio managers decide to move out of the dollar, U.S. securities markets, and
investment activity? The dollar could fall substantially, reinforcing sales of U.S.
stocks, mutual funds, and "overpriced U.S. assets." Id.
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economic strains to get out of hand, even in relatively prosperous
times. Certainly, nobody predicted the Great Depression of 1929.
Many had believed that new levels of prosperity were spreading
worldwide. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 had just outlawed war
in a context of confidence in general disarmament and the League of
Nations.
Many believe, however, that the United States should somehow
deploy stronger trade, industrial, fiscal, and tax policies to improve
U.S. growth prospects.43 As U.S. growth slows and a recession
broadens, budget deficits are expected. Within limits, Keynesian
fiscal deficit policies (new spending and tax relief for economic
recovery) make sense.4 From 1992 to 1996, elimination of excessive
U.S. budget deficits allowed lower interest rates, and stronger
43. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (selecting the best mix of
policies). Between 1982 and 2002, William A. Lovett argued for more effective
U.S. fiscal and budget discipline (reduced deficits), monetary discipline
(reasonable restraint-relaxed in recessions), wage-price discipline (ample
competition and supervision), and stronger balance of payments discipline (tougher
trade policy and minimal trade-current account deficits). Id. See also WILLIAM A.
LOVETT, INFLATION AND POLITICS 185-95 (1982) [hereinafter LOVETT, INFLATION
AND POLITICS] (recommending steps to improve growth in the U.S. economy);
WILLIAM A. LOVETT, BANKING AND FINANCIAL. INSTITUTIONS IN A NUTS1IELL
429-40 (5th ed. 2000) (outlining current economic problems and suggesting more
effective U.S. economic policy). With these policies, U.S. productivity and growth
would be steadier and healthier. Id. U.S. federal debt (now $5,800 billion) and
external debts ($2,700 billion) would be much lower, U.S. exports stronger, and
U.S. imports not so large. The WTO would also be more limited and less
polarizing. See supra notes 4 and 15 and accompanying text (providing reference
to papers addressing trade-related security challenges and current WTO policy).
44. See LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note I, at 5 (stating that many
nations learned that Keynesian budget deficit policies should be implemented in
times of recession). In recessions, it makes sense to run moderate government
deficits, ease monetary policy, and lower interest rates. See LOVETT, INFLATION
AND POLITICS, supra note 43, at 57-78 (discussing varying proposed responses to
recessions). Excess trade and current account deficits, however, along with large
net foreign debts, normally impose constraints. Id. Yet, the United States enjoyed
strong economic growth between 1982 and 1991, and pro-business policies,
renewed between 1993 and 2000, with stronger budget discipline (helped by
reduced defense spending and social security surpluses-depression babies retiring
later and in fewer numbers). Id. These factors, once combined with a U.S. stock
market boom, promote confidence in the U.S. markets. The lack of safe, credible
reserve currency alternatives for medium-term global investment and liquidity
helped to sustain increasing net foreign investment into the United States. Id. at
110-15.
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economic growth between 1993 and 2000. The United States, had
other good luck as well. Improved computerization, high tech
innovations, lower production costs (partly from moving plants
overseas), and major inflows of foreign investment into the U.S. all
played a role. What brought increased foreign investment into the
United States, especially between 1995 and 2000? The euro zone had
slower growth and many worries. World capital surged heavily into
emerging markets between 1990 and 1994, but then slowed
considerably after Mexico's crisis and devaluation in late 1994.'5
Then the Asian crises in 1997-1998 brought a lot more flight capital
into the United States.46 The U.S. stock market boom was enhanced,
which also attracted more foreign capital from Europe, Asia, Latin
America, and elsewhere. Luckily, when the U.S. stock bubble sagged
sharply in 2001, other foreign stock markets sagged as much or
more. Interestingly, this prevented any stampede out of the dollar
into the euro or other markets for some time. 7
In early 2002, however, the euro replaced long established
national currencies in twelve of the fifteen EU member economies.
Euro notes and coins finally replaced German marks, French and
Belgian francs, Italian lire, Spanish pesetas, and Dutch guilders.
Only Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom held out for
45. See Lovett, Train Wreck, supra note 2, at 420 (describing how the U.S.
dollar, its stock markets, and debt markets were more attractive as safe havens as
the Mexican, Asian, Russian, Brazilian, and other foreign currency crises and
devaluations occurred in 1994-1995 and 1997-1998).
46. See id. (commenting on the impact that foreign currency crises and
devaluations had on the U.S. dollar and its stock markets).
47. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (addressing the need for
improved financial structure in light of recent financial crisis in Argentina and
events like the Enron bankruptcy). Increased foreign investment into the United
States after the early 1990s was revealed dramatically in the expanding U.S.
current account deficits (and net foreign inflows of capital) between 1991-2001,
i.e., from around S I10 billion to S450 billion annually. See infra Tables 1,2, and 3
(charting the U.S. GNP, federal debt, import and exports, providing statistics for
regional trade balances, and charting U.S. international business transactions from
1998 to 2001).
48. See Andrew Borowiec, In With the New: Euro Debuts With Fanfare,
Trepedation, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at C7 (discussing the debut of the euro in
twelve countries); see also Euro 2002 Information Campaign (providing detailed
information about implementation of the euro), at http://www.euro.ecb.int (last
visited March 6, 2002).
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awhile, retaining their kroners and pounds sterling. The ECB
emerged from its trial period with increasing confidence. The ECB's
moderate, sensible policies took a middle path, thus avoiding undue
restrictiveness, while remaining reasonably firm against inflation."'
Now that the euro is securely established (after a lengthy, gradual
gestation process), the U.S. dollar has an equal, solid rival as a
reserve currency and money market. While European stock markets
are not so broadly developed or as fully trusted as U.S. markets by
global investors, the Enron-Anderson stock fraud-auditing scandal of'
2001-2002 plays an important role in highlighting problems within
U.S. markets as well.
50
This means, realistically, that the U.S. dollar and capital market no
longer enjoy a free ride as the only large, reasonable haven to place
global liquidity and medium-term investments. Confidence in the
dollar and U.S. stock markets will depend increasingly upon real
U.S. earnings, industrial growth, and export growth. In other words,
the U.S. dollar will be measured more by its fundamentals, as are all
other currencies. In this regard, global investors and capitals will not
so easily tolerate the big U.S. trade and current account deficits.5'
49. See Edmund Andrews, European Central Bank President Stepping Down,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at WI (discussing the impact of the change in the ECB
presidency); Tony Barber, Duisenberg Ends Speculation As He Sets Leaving l)ate:
ECB President Sa's He Will Step Down in Summer 2003 But Fails to Endorse
Likel , Successor Jean-Claude Trichet, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2002, at I (reporting
Wim Duisenberg's decision to step down as ECB president); Peter Norman,
German,, May Take Its Own Medicine, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at 6 (discussing
the European Commission's possible warning to Germany for danger of violating
the EU's stability and growth pact); see also Tony Barber, Robust Dollar Tempers
New Cash "Europhoria, " FIN. TIMES, Jan 30, 2002, at 6 (reporting a rise in the
euro was followed by a steep decline). The most important factor in the euro's
decline seems to be productivity, with faster declines in U.S. employment than
output, whereas in the euro area output fell faster than employment. There is a
need for more complete data on the "fundamentals," i.e., growth, productivity,
employment, inflation, and profits to resolve these issues. Id. But see Tony Barber,
Euro "Ve , undervalued, " Says Noyer, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at 8 (discussing
ECB Vice President Noyer's remarks on the value of the euro in comparison to the
U.S. dollar).
50. See Gretchen Morgenson, The Markets: Stocks & Bonds; Worries of More
Enrons to Come Give Stock Prices a Pounding, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at CI
(considering the impact of the Enron-Anderson incident on other companies' stock
prices and the U.S. economy as a whole).
51. See The U.S. Trade Deficit: Causes, Consequences and Recommendations
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Achieving a "better," sustainable U.S. external balance will regain
importance as a discipline and constraint upon U.S. trading policies.
"Join the Club" will be the prevailing reaction of foreign central
bankers, finance ministers, and money traders around the world.
Why was the U.S. dollar king for so long? Simply because no other
country was really large and strong enough, economically, to rival
the U.S. and its dollar when the British Empire weakened and began
to disintegrate in the later 1940s.12 Now, in 2002, the EU's
integration success and its new composite currency, the euro,
brought into being a worthy and comparable rival.
II. IMPROVING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS AND
TRADING BALANCES
Like the British Empire, and the United States in the late 1940s,
the European Union and the United States in the early twenty-first
century should remain allies and mutually important trading partners.
Economic competition, however, continues with outstanding trade
frictions. This rivalry can promote efficiency and joint welfare within
limits. The same applies to U.S. relations within NAFTA (United
States, Canada, and Mexico), most of the Caribbean, Latin America,
Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, East Asia (Japan, South Korea,
China, and Taiwan), ASEAN and the Indian subcontinent, Eastern
for Action, U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission (stating the overall current
trade deficit of GDP reached over four percent in 2000), at
http://vwwv.ustdrc.gov/reports/finalrep-contents.html, at Chap. 4, at
http://wv-v.ustdrc.gov/reports/tdrc-ch4.pdf (last visited lar. 8, 2002).
52. See Lovett, Post-Cold War Era, supra note 4, at 136-39 (providing
historical background and events regarding the British Empire and its economy).
Great Britain's economy became badly strained in six years of World War II. Id. at
138. The British were fighting against Germany, largely alone, between June 1940
and June 1941, and without major help from Russia and the U.S. until the fall of
1942. Id. The costs for Britain of drastic mobilization, heavy fighting, post-War
conversion, expensive efforts to contain Russia, and disrupted British exports were
severe. Id. By contrast, U.S. GNP doubled between 1940 and 1945, its industry
and technology flourished, and U.S. exports dominated world markets in the later
1940s to early 1950s. See ALEC CAIRNCROSS & BARRY EICiIENGREEN, STERLING
IN DECLINE, THE DEVALUATIONS OF 1931, 1949 AND 1967 111-39 (1983)
(discussing the devaluation of sterling following the end of World War 11). See
generally ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: FIGHTING FOR BRITAIN,
1937-1946 (2000) (explaining the financial strains for Great Britain from World
War II, which undermined the pound sterling as a reserve currency).
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Europe and the former U.S.S.R., and parts of the Mid-East and
Africa. Major cross-investments, technology flows, and active
trading can be beneficial to most countries. Each nation, though,
should take care that its engagement with world markets is healthy
and productive. 3
Nations are primarily responsible for their own welfare, economic
productivity, and prosperous trading relations. Within limits, of
course, collaboration among groups of countries (or the overall
global economy) may be jointly beneficial, too. Each country,
however, must be its own manager and strive for a fair share of
mutual trading and technology sharing gains. Bilateral, regional, and
multilateral arrangements are means to these ends. Our competitive
global marketplace is somewhat disorderly, with rivalries and
incomplete information. Bad or disruptive behavior, however, can be
limited to some extent, and more productive collaboration can be
encouraged. Within this welter of government and market activity,
"business" enterprises and people are struggling to succeed, protect
themselves, and prosper. The art of sensible regulation within and
among nations, ideally at least, is devoted to improving the welfare
of the many nations, peoples, and enterprises of our world. Views
differ, however, on the proper roles of government activity, private
enterprise, and reasonable regulation. The spectrum ranges from
conservative free market to social market economies, with some
protectionist mercantilism for most NICs and LDCs. Consequently,
complete agreement or consensus is unrealistic. Some discord and
conflict are probably inevitable, with mood swings and shifts in
fashion.
The original GATT in 1947 promoted open trading and non-
discrimination through tariff reductions, the most favored nation
("MFN") principle, and national treatment obligations. 4 GATT 1947
demonstrated an understanding of important limits. Countries could
still protect national defense industries, regulated agriculture, health,
safety, and culture. Furthermore, countervailing duties were allowed
53. See Lovett, Current World Trade Agenda, supra note 4, at 2035-40
(surveying the residual effects of GATT 1994-WTO on NICs, LDCs, and other
countries, including the United States).
54. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- I,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
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against "unfair trade practices," i.e., foreign subsidies and "dumping"
(discount sales into other markets at lower than domestic or normal
prices). Safeguard relief limited disruptions from imports although
"compensation" caused countries to lose exports. Import restrictions
could achieve balance of payments relief, although such actions were
supposed to be non-discriminatory and taken in consultation with the
IMFi56
Successive GATT rounds between 1947 and 1979 brought broad
tariff reductions among advanced industrial nations." Developing
countries were allowed, however, to keep much higher tariffs. OECD
nations accepted this asymmetry because they enjoyed a continuing
prosperity edge, and MNCs found it convenient to relocate more
manufacturing to lower wage nations.
By 1982 to 1984, a global recession and debt overload crisis
threatened to disrupt things. There was fear of a general financial
breakdown and a return to widespread protectionism like the 1930s.
Between 1947 and 1982, U.S. international economic policies (freer
trade, help for allies, and collective security of Western nations
against Communism) were largely agreed. But in the 1980's,
significant divisions developed in the United States between those
wanting more limits, reciprocity, and safeguarding (e.g. the Omnibus
Trade bills sponsored by many Democrats in Congress), and those
wanting more open, albeit non-reciprocal trading that especially
benefited MNCs. At issue was the extent to which U.S.-led,
55. See LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing GATT
1947 and its allowance for safeguard relief and antidumping and countervailing
duties for subsidy relief under Article VI).
56. See id. GATT 1947 was a good framework for freer world countries in the
late 1940s and at least into the 1980s. Some believe these arrangements are still the
best available. GATT 1947 served well to expand trade, investment, and
technology sharing, even though it placed a few checks on international trade to
foster fuller employment and limit costly disruptions. GATT 1947 also operated to
enforce substantial reciprocity of benefits as well. From a "social market
economy" viewpoint, GATT 1947 is an excellent architecture, but it serves well
also to mediate among a broad spectrum of countries (free market, through
moderate welfare states, to more statist and/or socialist countries). li.
57. See A Brief History of The General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade,
(providing background on the objectives and goals of the GATT rounds), at
http://pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/trade/GATT-rounds.html (last visited March 7,
2002).
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asymmetrically open-trade policy would pass through benefits to
almost all people (or just to limited classes of MNC beneficiaries-
favored industries, services, and higher income stockholders). These
big political issues are still controversial.
After Reagan won re-election in November 1984, the United
States took the lead and most countries accepted the Uruguay GATT
Round negotiations. The United States played an important role in
framing the goals and concessions for this round's conclusions from
1991 through 1993. We are living with the mixed results today.
Threatened communities, industries, and workers, as well as many
environmentalists and varied critics of large MNCs, are still opposed
to non-reciprocal freer trade,. However, in periods spanning from
1982 to 1991 and 1993 to 2000, the U.S. economy enjoyed relatively
good growth, so that a more unilateral U.S. freer trade policy of the
GATT 1994-WTO Agreement (favoring MNCs) was tolerated by the
public majority. Nevertheless, this political consent was conditional
upon the large U.S. majority benefiting from the policy.
The GATT 1994-WTO Agreement lowered tariffs on
manufacturers in many developing countries by roughly one-third
(from fifty percent to thirty-five percent, or twenty-five percent to
fifteen percent). The United States, European Union, and Japan, at
least in terms of tariffs, remained much more open. Hopes for
improved investment and intellectual property protections were
added under the General Agreement on Trade Services ("GATS")
and GATT Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs"), and at least an aspirational
goal of greater openness for markets in services was agreed. (In fact,
a more important wave of bilateral investment treaties between 1975
and 1993 had greatly strengthened foreign investor confidence in
many developing countries.) Antidumping remedies were only
slightly weakened in GATT 1994, but most developing nation
subsidies and industrial policies were tolerated. The dispute
resolution process was fundamentally transformed. Now WTO
panels could bind nations to a new "rules-based process" of
enforcement for accumulated GATT rules and concessions. In fact,
on June 10, 1994, United States Trade Representative ("USTR")
Mickey Kantor promised Congress that it was only a theoretical
possibility that GATT panels could ever rule against U.S. interests,
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since the United States always favored free trade." This estimate
proved quite inaccurate and naive. 9
By the end of 2001, seven years after Congress approved the
Uruguay Round agreements in November 1994,' the United States
had lost twenty significant WTO disputes, and another twelve lesser
decisions.61 More alarming was a trend of challenges to U.S. trade
58. See WTO Hearing, supra note 2 (reciting Kantor's testimony); see also
infi'a note 60 (citing U.S. implementation of Uruguay Round Agreement).
59. See ifi'fa note 61 and accompanying text (showing the mixed results for the
United States in WTO disputes).
60. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994) (codifying the Uruguay Round Agreements
signed by President Clinton). The statute provides:
(A)(1) United States law to prevail in conflict.
No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application
of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with
any law of the United States shall have effect.
(2) Construction.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed:
(A) to amend or modify any law of the United States, including or any law
relating to-
(i) the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health,
(ii) the protection of the environment, or
(iii) worker safety, or
(B) to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United States,
including § 2411 of this title [Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974].
61. See Snapshot of WTO Cases Involving the United States (summarizing
preliminary assessments of WTO complaints and litigations between 1994-
February 6, 2002), at http//www.ustr.gov/enforcement/snapshot.html (last updated
Feb. 6, 2002). The preliminary assessment shows fifty-five complaints filed
against the United States and fifty-seven complaints filed by the United States. Id.
With the United States as respondent, there were seventeen U.S. losses, including:
Tuna/Dolphin; Gasoline from Venezuela & Brazil; Underwear from Costa Rica;
Wool shirts from India; Shrimp/turtle law; DRAM's from Korea; Leaded bars
from UK; Music licensing in U.S. copyright law; 1916 Revenue Act; Bonding
requirement on EU goods; Wheat gluten import safeguard; Stainless steel from
Korea; Lamb meat import safeguard; Hot-rolled steel from Japan; Cotton yarn
from Pakistan; Section 211 of Omnibus Appropriations Act; and Taxes on Foreign
Sales Corporations. The United States conceded on twelve cases: Autos from
Japan; Wool coats from India; Various products from EU; Tomatoes from Mexico;
Poultry from EU; Urea from Germany; Brooms from Colombia; Helms Burton
Act; TV's from Korea; Cattle Swine & Grain from Canada; Textiles from EU; and
Massachusetts government procurement. Id. In addition, eight cases remain in
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law remedies (antidumping, counter-vailing duties, and Section 301
cases).62 Partly because of attitudes signaled by Presidents Clinton
and Bush and their USTRs, U.S. trade partners do not fear tough
U.S. trade law enforcement for effective reciprocity. Rather, the
United States has been relatively accommodating, except for the
foreign sales corporations tax waiver provision and agriculture cases
involving bananas, beef hormones, a threat of further EU challenges
to genetically modified food products, and recent steel safegaurd
relief. To date, the United States has not yet blocked progress on the
Doha Round, or suggested possible withdrawal from the WTO.' 3
litigation (panels or appeals), five cases are in consultation, and eight are being
monitored or inactive. Id. The United States has won only two cases as respondent:
Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974; and CVD regulations. /d. With the
United States as complainant, the United States lost three cases: Japan-film
imports; EU/Ireland/UK tariff classification of computer equipment; Korea-airport
procurement. Id. The U.S. prevailed in fifteen cases: Japan-liquor taxes; Canada-
magazine imports; EU-banana imports; EU hormone treated beef imports; India-
patent protection; Argentina-textile imports; Indonesia auto regime; Korea liquor
taxes; Japan fruit imports; Canada-dairy sector; Australia-leather subsidies; India-
import licensing; Mexico-antidumping duties on corn syrup; Canada-patent law;
Korea-beef imports. Id. Unfortunately, in many of these wins there has been no
effective enforcement. The United States Trade Representative ("USTR") claims
to have resolved nineteen U.S. complaints to its satisfaction, two remain in
litigation, five are in consultation, with eleven inactive or being monitored for
progress. Id. See also WTO United Front Against U.S. Law, GAZETTA MERCANTIL
ONLINE, Feb. 5, 2002, at 1 (discussing a coalition formed to challenge the "Byrd
Amendment"). In addition to these cases, on February 5, 2002, Brazil and twenty-
eight other countries filed a new WTO case against the United States that
challenges the U.S. "Byrd amendment," which allows monies collected from anti-
dumping and subsidy cases under U.S. trade laws to be allocated to U.S.
companies that bring these complaints. Id. More cases will follow on steel
safeguards.
62. See GREG MASTEL, AMERICAN TRADE LAW, AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND
11-62 (1996) (discussing generally Section 301, analyzing cases under Section
301, and presenting critique of Section 301). Clearly, Congress mandated for the
USTR the continuation of U.S. trade law under GATT 1947 and other legislation.
See 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (describing the USTR's role in U.S. trade law under GATT).
WTO complaints challenge the fundamental bargain represented by the Uruguay
Round agreements and could force U.S. withdrawal from the WTO Linder Article
XV of the WTO Agreement (which requires merely six months notice to the WTO
Director General). See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81, art. XV (1994)
(permitting withdrawal after six months notice).
63. See WTO Agreement, art. XV (establishing permission for withdrawal after
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President George W. Bush seems to believe in freer trade, perhaps
more than Clinton. 6 Congress, though, was unwilling to grant
additional fast-track authority to Clinton between 1994 and 2000. In
2001, President Bush pushed hard for new Trade Promotion
Authority ("TPA"). 65 The U.S. House of Representatives agreed, but
by only one vote (215-214).66 House members required significant
protectionist concessions to secure even this thin majority .6  The
U.S. Senate waited until Spring 2002 to act in anticipation of the
President announcing his disposition of U.S. International Trade
six months notice).
64. See Edward Alden, Bush's Trade Gap: The Fate of the President's
Liberalisation Agenda Hangs On Tomorrow's Vote on Fast-Track Authority, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at 14 (discussing the uphill battle faced by the Bush
Administration to get congressional approval for "fast-track" trade negotiating
authority). While the first fast-track passed easily in 1974, serious opposition
began to surface following a series of big trade deals completed in the early 1990s.
Id. Fast-track began to lapse in 1994; and 1997-1998 demonstrated the rejection of
efforts to revive it. Id. See also Edward Alden & Peronet Despeignes, Bush Faced
By Fresh Hurdle Over Fast-Track, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at 11 (noting that the
newest hurdle for the Bush Administration are demands by Senate Democrats to
expand benefits for workers unemployed because of international competition);
Edward Alden & James Kynge, Trade Deal Authority: Florida Offers Bush a
Route to Fast-Track, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at I 1 (describing obstacles faced by
the Bush Administration in rallying support for fast-track authority from the
Florida's House delegation).
65. See Alden & Despeignes, supra note 64, at II (stating that the Bush
Administration "pushed aggressively" for negotiating authority that would give the
United States "a freer hand" to carry out new trade agreements); Dave Boyer, Fast-
Track Trade Talks Break Down, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at A8 (noting that
President Bush hosted approximately twenty House Democrats at the White House
to seek votes for trade negotiating authority); Martin Crutsinger, Bush Pushes for
More Trade Authority, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 17, 2001 (describing President
Bush's efforts for a new round of talks regarding trade authority as "ambitious"),
available at 2001 WL 30246184; David Lazarus, Bush Ma ' Be On Right Trade
Track, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 21, 2002, at El (noting President Bush's efforts to rally
support for free trade and a "new era of globalization"); Edwin Meese Ill & Todd
Gaziano, Editorial, Trade and Sovereign,, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at A19
(commenting on trade authority powers of the president).
66. See Helene Cooper et al., House Votes Wide Trade Powers for Bush, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 7, 2001, at A3 (reporting House approval by a single vote for
fast-track authority to negotiate trade deals by President Bush).
67. See David Sanger, Bush Declares Free Markets Are Essential for
Americas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A9 (stating President Bush's support for
free market reforms and a return to "an era of protectionism").
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Commission recommendations for significant safeguards and anti-
dumping relief for the U.S. steel industry.68 It is not clear how much
U.S. negotiating leverage really exists for the Doha Round in the
next several years. Partisan conflict clearly returned to Congress in
early 2002, highlighted by the Enron-Anderson stock fraud-auditing
scandal. Most now expect a closely contested fall 2002 election for
upcoming congressional control. The bi-partisan mood after
September 11 th is fading.69
Meanwhile, apart from U.S. politics, trade experts are raising
questions regarding the wisdom of the new WTO Dispute Settlement
process, increasingly stubborn conflicts, and winner/loser
contentiousness.70 Many argue now that conciliation, mediation, and
68. See Elizabeth Olson, Squabbles at the Start for World Trade Talks. N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at WI (discussing problems arising following the
announcement of the new global round of trade talks in Doha, Qatar). The U.S.
Senate plans to delay its vote on "fast track" trade deal authority until after
President Bush resolves how much safeguard relief will be given to the U.S. steel
industry. See Anne E. Komblut & Sue Kirchhoff, Bush Slaps Tariffs" on Steel
Imports U.S. Initiative Seeks Levies Up to 30%, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 2002, at
Fl (reporting President Bush's decision to impose "stiff" tariffs on steel imports
despite protests by foreign allies).
69. See Boyer. supra note 65, at A8 (reporting stalled talks between Ilouse
Republican and Democratic negotiators as President Bush failed to persuade a
number of undecided Democrats); Carter Dougherty, Congress Leety on Trade Bill
After Pact, WASH. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 2001, at C9 (describing skepticism by key
members of Congress following a global trade pact to free up world commerce):
Carter Dougherty, Labor Agency Worker Retraining Program Likel' to Continue,
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002 (reporting a renewal of a Department of Labor
worker retaining program, despite its poor record for helping people who lost jobs
to free trade); George Edmondson, Georgians Say Bush Pledged to Help Textile
Industiy, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 23, 2002, at 13A (stating that Georgia
Congressmen Mac Collins and Saxby Chambliss who voted to give President Bush
more power to negotiate trade treaties believe in the President's commitment to
help the textile industry); Juliet Eilperin, Will Lawmaker PavJor Trade Vote? In
Reversal From '94, Democrats Target Republican Who Gave Bush Win. WASII.
POST, Dec. 14, 2001, at A56 (commenting on the effect of the deciding vote cast
by Rep. Robin Hayes that gave President Bush enhanced authority to engage in
international trade agreements); Charles Rangel, The Wrong Approach To Trade,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at 17 (arguing that Republican attempts to pass a fast-
track trade authority endangers "a rare opportunity to build a broad bipartisan
consensus" that supports new job opportunities and improved living standards).
70. See CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: Tilt:
FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 7 (2001) (arguing that "the new
'judicialized' WTO dispute settlement system is substantively and politically
976 [17:951
IMPLEMENTING THE DOHA ROUND
voluntary arbitration under GATT 1947 worked better for trade
relations.7' Some believe that the increasingly polarized, unyielding
conflicts over WTO panel and appellate body decisions will not be
sustainable. WTO reform or abolition should come soon, say the
skeptics.
72
unsustainable"). Barfield explains that the underlying texts have too many gaps,
ambiguities, and contradictions to serve as an adequate basis for a -rules based"
system. Id. Further, WTO panels and appellate body litigation are producing
difficult political conflicts. Id. Studies conducted by Robert Hudec have led
Barfield to conclude that the old GATT dispute resolution process has received a
"bad rap." Id. at 40. Mediation and conciliation got good results more than ninety
percent of the time. Id. Barfield's book cites extensively to many recent trade
lawyers and scholars to document and elaborate this thesis. /d.
71. See JACKSON, supra note 31, at 98-99 (proposing in 1990 a WTO with a
more limited five-part dispute settlement process). The five-part process includes:
(i) bilateral consultation; (ii) mediation and conciliation; (iii) an impartial finding
or ruling; (iv) a "political filter" of acceptance by a representative body; and, (v) a
sanctioning process such as withdrawal of concessions. Id. at 98. This was wiser,
more realistic, and more sustainable than the WTO of 1994 and its eight years of
panel-appellate body experience. See generally Lovett, Train Wreck, supra note 2,
at 410-16 (discussing general problems with the GATT 1994-WTO regime). Some
WTO enthusiasts are trying to make a global economic constitution on neo-liberal
lines out of GATT 1994 and the DSU. Most developing countries will not allow
such disruptive foreign interventions, and certainly not China, India, or Russia. id.
at 416. Nor, in the end, will the OECD nations, including the United States,
European Union, and Japan. Id. While some international law scholars always
wanted to move toward global legal governance, the GATT 1994-\\riO framework
does not meet this foundational need. Id.
72. See generally Lovett, Current World Trade Agenda, supra note 4
(discussing unresolved problems of asymmetries affecting the United States and
OECD nations). The WTO's political mandate is totally lacking. Nobody intended
(certainly not the U.S. Congress) for this flawed and unbalanced trade agreement
to become an economic constitution of the whole world. Massive asymmetries and
developing country preferences (from Article II schedules of concessions through
many other GATT provisions) undercut any possible claim to long run viability or
fairness for the United States and other OECD nations. Id. Ironically, most LDCs
are unhappy now with the world trade order, too. Id. Moreover, the present one
country-one vote voting structure failed to create a framework that protected large
country interests (except for the EU confederation with its many direct and
influenced votes). See Lovett, Train Wreck, supra note 2, at 411 (arguing that the
WTO's decision-making and voting structure is a "'contradictory mess."). While
GATT 1947 and GATT 1994-WTO are stepping stones toward greater regulation
of world trade, they are more like the American Continental Congress (1775-81)
and later Articles of Confederation (1781-89). Pervasive asymmetries and unfair,
unbalanced voting prevent the initial WTO from meeting the needs of a healthy,
sustainable global economic constitution. See id. at 417 (describing that from the
standpoint of a "healthy, balanced, and sustainable global economy," the GATT
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Furthermore, from a constitutional structural viewpoint, many
insist now that the GATT-WTO "rules network" simply lacks the
precision, completeness, and coherence to justify any rigid, strict
pattern of WTO panel and appellate decisions.73 Many trade issues
are not that clear. Yet, an aggressive, rapid-fire "black or white" set
of WTO "answers" leaves losing parties with a sense of grievance. In
other words, there is an inherent ambiguity (reasonable countries can
respond in diverse ways) for economic, regulatory, and
environmental decision-making. The WTO's dictatorial, czar-like
powers, exceed the WTO's original mandate and political support as
a fledgling organization.
While some scholars hail the new WTO and its "decisions" as a
world economic constitution, opposition is growing among
developing countries, OECD nations, and NGOs spanning the
political spectrum. Many advise, therefore, at least a tactical retreat
by the WTO, with more cautious and corrective constraints, in order
to preserve the WTO's existence in a vortex of difficult political
decisions.74
The Doha Round was contentious from the beginning. Developing
countries wanted to renege on intellectual property, as well as other
concessions granted to advanced nations and to MNCs, and they
demanded "implementation" that expands developing country
exports. Japan was defensive with little willingness for concessions
in a sustained slump and debt overload crisis. The European Union
was cautious and bargaining hard, and unlikely to offer much leeway
in its agricultural protection (the "CAP"). This leaves great pressure
on President Bush and the United States to offer substantial
concessions at a time when the country suffers from very large trade
1994-WTO regime is "needlessly flawed"). The current WTO is to be understood
only as a provisional, transitory arrangement. Id.
73. See generally BARFIELD, supra note 70 (noting the varying opinions of
legal scholars regarding the shortcomings of the current GATT-WTO dispute
resolution system and contradictory structures put in place to settle international
disagreements).
74. See id. at 6 (claiming that criticism from both right and left, together with
an expanding range of NGOs and many divergent countries, offer too many wide
and difficult political challenges for the present WTO). Barfield urges for a more
limited, cautious range of resolution. Id. An emphasis is needed on conciliation
and mediation in trade-economic conflicts among nations. Id. at 7.
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and current account deficits. The United States is almost completely
open to most imports already, so how much more openness can it
concede? The real leverage of the United States is implicit, i.e.,
"Would you like to enjoy continued access to the giant U.S.
markets?" Thus far, USTR Zoelick has not revealed any "mailed
fist" underneath the soft glove of USTR diplomacy (except, perhaps,
for steel safeguards). President Bush and Zoelick may not fully
understand what they are up against.
After Doha, most developing nations want more safeguard relief
(often against each other), an assurance of substantially increased
exports, and a reduced risk of devaluations and financial crises.
Many feel shortchanged from the 1990s boom. Europe and Japan
still enjoy export surpluses against the United States and would like
to keep them. Yet, the United States suffers increased and big trade
and current account deficits. How is the United States supposed to
improve its external balances in this situation? Increased foreign
investment and net lending to the United States create a growing
charge on U.S. earnings from the world economy, which gradually
aggravates the external accounts problem for the United States."5 The
awkward implication for the United States and its trade partners
(who are both responsible for this mutual imbalance) is that the
United States must finance and service this growing net obligation to
foreign peoples with increased exports of U.S. goods and services.
Strangely, however, neither the United States nor most of its trade
75. See LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 136-72 (providing a
careful estimate of the U.S. net investment position for 1998). In 1980, the United
States enjoyed a net creditor position of around S+-141 billion on a 1980 GNP of
S2,626 billion (less than +.05 percent). Id. at 6 n.7. After S-1,650 billion in U.S.
accumulated current account deficits between 1981 and 1997, the U.S. net
investment could be estimated reasonably at S-1,250 to S-1,500 billion on a 1997
GNP of S8,000 billion (roughly negative sixteen percent of GNP net external
indebtedness). Id. After at least another S-1,350 billion of U.S. current account
deficits between 1998 and 2001, i.e., net capital inflows, the U.S. net investment
position for year end 2001 was at least S-2,500 to S-3,000 billion on a 2001 GNP
of S10,000 billion (approximately negative twenty-seven percent net external
indebtedness). Id. This tallies closely with Ronald McKinnon's net investment
position of S-2,700 billion. See McKinnon, supra note 14, at 15 (raising concerns
that foreign indebtedness will rise given the country's net debtor position of S2.7
billion). See also Baker, supra note 14, at 10 (juxtaposing the economic policies of
George W. Bush and Ronald Reagan and discussing the potential imbalances
posed by these policies).
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partners seem adequately aware of their mutual predicament. Sadly,
the GATT 1994-WTO arrangements have merely entrenched U.S.
trade and current account deficits. Moreover, the forthcoming Doha
WTO Round seems likely, many believe, to increase the U.S. trade
and current account deficits even further.76
III. NEW U.S. POLICIES AND DIFFICULTIES
AHEAD
Obviously, the United States should expand exports of goods and
services, reduce trade and current account deficits, and, if necessary,
cut imports. This is hard to achieve quickly and will find initial
resistance from many U.S. trading partners. Without a major dollar
devaluation, achievement of this swing in trade balances leaves many
in doubt.
"Soft landing" optimists say that large foreign investments into the
U.S. could still be forthcoming in sufficient volume for years.
Maybe. The net result of most Doha WTO Round proposals from the
developing countries and other OECD nations, however, will only
entrench the current U.S. structural trade deficit problems.
The best mix of U.S. policies should emphasize greater realism
and broader understanding of this predicament. Unfortunately,
adequate appreciation of the U.S. "structural" trade-current account
deficits is sorely lacking. One possible explanation is that from the
1970s to the 1990s, international finance experts looked mainly at
the "fundamentals," i.e., key indicators of national economic
performance. Most crucial were economic growth, low inflation,
market indexes (including equity markets), budget deficits, and trade
and current account deficits. By these standards, the United States,
with the only viable reserve currency in the world, looked good
between 1983 and 1991, and very good between 1994 and 2000. The
dissonant U.S. external deficits were explained away as a confidence
in the United States by foreign investors who lacked sufficient
investment opportunities in their own markets.
76. See Crooks & Waters, sup-a note 14, at 7 (discussing the various economic
factors that are likely to contribute to a more tenuous international economy and
continued problems with the U.S. dollar and deficits).
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U.S. economic leaders never found it appropriate to warn of these
dangers (Fred Bergston of Institute for International Economics
being a rare exception). Furthermore, the "structural" asymmetries
aggravated by GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement were not
adequately understood by the majority of U.S. economists. Most U.S.
trade economists assumed that freer trade in the long run must flow
from the new trade regime. The short and medium-run asymmetries
that increased U.S. trade and current account deficits were neglected.
Hot money flows and devaluations in Mexico, Asia, Brazil, Russia,
and now Argentina aggravated these international trade-finance
imbalances. Therefore, a top priority is a change in U.S. and foreign
mindsets." Across-the-board recognition of interdependence is a
must. Most other countries accept serious balance of payments
discipline for themselves. Excessive trade and current account
deficits in most other nations bring prompt penalties, i.e.,
devaluation, reduced incomes, and belt tightening. At several stages
in the post-World War II era (1968-1971: 1976-1980), the U.S.
dollar did sag somewhat in foreign confidence, with far more limited
U.S. balance of payment deficits than occurred between 1985 and
2002. Reflecting on the lessons of 1968 through 1971 and 1975
through 1980, some of the reasons as to why the U.S. dollar could
decline due to seemingly intractable U.S. trade and current account
deficits include: (i) renewed U.S. fiscal deficits caused by political
gridlock; (ii) costly and unsuccessful wars (unlike the quick results in
Afghanistan in 2001-2002); (iii) a failure of the U.S. economy and
manufacturing to rebound solidly from 2002 to 2005; (iv) a
substantial fall in U.S. stock prices; (v) more success and growth in
the EU; (vi) a renewed world energy crunch and OPEC embargo;
and, (vii) other serious misadventures."8
77. See generally Claude Smadja, The End of Coniplacenv: Prescription of
Capitalism As An International Panacea Has Reached Its Peak, 113 FOREIGN
POL'Y 67 (1998) (asserting that the world's financial crisis is the result of
"complacency and arrogance" by developed countries' leaders who assume the
world should be organized after its own model); George Soros, Capitalism "s Last
Chance, 113 FOREIGN POL'Y 55 (1998) (arguing that the financial and political
crisis will lead to the "disintegration of the global capitalist system if left
unchecked"); Robert Wade, The Coining Fight Over Capital Flows, 113 FOREIGN
POL'Y 41 (1998) (reviewing the growing conflicts over international financial
issues between the United States, Europe, and Asia).
78. A special factor of U.S. vulnerability is that U.S. international currency
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Once properly informed, however, most U.S. trade partners will
appreciate the need for external account discipline for Americans
since they learned the same discipline for themselves over the last
fifty to sixty years and more. The need for import/export adjustments
is mutual. The United States can still assert GATT 1947 offset
remedies (antidumping and subsidy relief measures under Article VI,
safeguard restrictions under Article XIX, and balance of payments
relief under Article XII) to help cut imports and restore its overall
trade balance over some years.79 Most countries, however, prefer
gradual corrections rather than any drastic slump in their exports to
the United States, which would bring recession, serious
unemployment, and political strains for their own governments. This
implies that some countries continued to tolerate the U.S. external
account deficits (extended over approximately four to six years). In a
rather bizarre way, both the United States and its bigger trading
partners share an unrealistic illusion. The United States is too
dependent on its enlarged trade and current account deficits, and net
capital imports, while many of its trading partners depend too much
on their large trade surpluses with the U.S.
reserves are now much thinner (or "weaker"). See 2001 ECON. REP. OF TilE
PRESIDENT, at Table B-I II (reporting International Reserves for the period of
1962-2000). In 1962, the United States had seventeen billion special drawing
rights ("SDR") in reserves and roughly a third of all international reserves held by
industrial countries. Id. By August 2000, the most recent data available, the United
States held only three percent, or fifty billion SDRs. Id. The euro countries held
204 billion SDRs. Id. Japan held 206 billion SDRs. Id. All developing countries,
including China and India, held 861 billion SDRs (thirteen times the size of the
U.S. international reserves). Id.
79. See Trade Law Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2001) (defining
unjustifiable trade practices and discrimination under Section 301). The United
States might also assert Section 301 unfair trade practice claims under its own
trade law, but this would be resented and lead to WTO complaints against the
United States, with likely adverse rulings by the WTO. See also LOVETr, U.S.
TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 143 (arguing that consolidated action should be
brought by the U.S. government against large, disproportionate trade surplus
countries under Section 301). It is better for the United States to concentrate on the
already widely accepted GATT Article VI (CVDs for dumping or subsidies),
safeguard relief under Article XIX, and/or balance of payments relief under Article
XII. See GATT 1994, arts. VI, XII, and XIX. See also LOvETT, U.S. TRADE
POLICY, supra note I, at 143 (noting actions that could be brought by the U.S.
government under GATT Article VI, XII, and XIX).
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U.S. leadership must prepare to take stronger action if threatened
by a major net outflow of investment funds, and deeper recession
and/or dollar devaluation crisis. U.S. policy responses should target
"fundamental flaws" in the current world trade regime. Specifically
the United States needs to: (i) correct unsustainable trade imbalances
and asymmetries that cannot continue much longer; (ii) move away
from unconditional, non-reciprocal MFN in GATT Article I that
entrenches unbalanced trade and investment flows; (iii) understand
that reciprocal trading-investment relationships will be achieved
more sensitively through bilateral and regional bargaining;s° and, (iv)
withdraw from the WTO, if necessary, to rebalance U.S. trade flows.
The present WTO, with one hundred and forty-four members (the
United States having only one vote), is incapable of prompt,
responsible action to reform trading relationships in any serious
global U.S. dollar crisis. Nor is the WTO inclined to help the United
States ease its balance of payments problems. Fortunately, the global
marketplace increasingly recognizes this "logjam problem." Chances
are that another WTO round will not substantially change anything.
This is why multinational lobbying interests lobby hard for
maintenance of the current system.
Yet, the United States must act promptly and effectively in a
global-dollar crisis. It is important, psychologically, that the United
States acts with ample "consultation" among significant trade
partners and with "sensitivity" to the vital interests of other
countries. The global marketplace is bound together in mutual
interdependence-for both good and ill."
80. See LovETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1. at 12 (requiring changes to
U.S. trade, current account, and external deficits for a healthier and more
prosperous U.S. policy). In early GATT round years (1946-1967), when the United
States enjoyed a big financial, industrial, and technology lead over its trade
partners, U.S. support for "unconditional MFN" was very reassuring to *'catch up"
countries in Europe, Japan, and developing nations. Id. at 8. However, by the later
1990s it became clear that reciprocity ("conditional MIFN") is now more
appropriate for world trade, except for the poorest and least developed countries
that need more kindness and protection for infant industries. Id. at 7.
81. See hifra Tables 1, 2, and 3 (summarizing the current account deficits and
level of international transactions over the past forty years). Focusing on U.S.
balance of payments relief, from the standpoint of most countries (and their own
historical experience), will be the most compelling, necessary, and understandable.
The United States must explain that a chronically, heavily unbalanced trading
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Accordingly, the strongest U.S. policy should emphasize GATT
Article XII (balance of payments relief measures) with special
attention focused on a carefil joint and independent action to
eliminate excessive and unsustainable U.S. trade deficits with key
trading partners. Most of the U.S. trade-current account deficit
problem arises out of only a few relationships: U.S.-Japan trade;
U.S.-China Trade; U.S.-ASEAN trade; and, to a lesser extent, U.S.-
EU trade and U.S.-NAFTA trade. This is a short and manageable list
of bilateral-regional relationships. GATT Article XII (balance of
payments relief) and the GATT 1994 Understanding on Balance of
Payments Problems provides for IMF consultation. Fortunately, the
IMF's Executive Board is a more flexible, workable institution (with
weighted voting and healthy traditions) than the WTO's General
Council and occasional trade round negotiations (with consensus
agreement expectations) and entrenched asymmetries.
8 2
relationship between the United States and its significant trading partners is simply
unsustainable. Id. There are a limited number of countries with special strategic
relationships that deserve special consideration. Turkey, Afghanistan, the Gulf oil
states, Panama, Russia, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and a few others could justify
continuing trade surpluses with the United States on these strategic grounds.
However, the big U.S. trade deficits are with China, Japan, ASEAN, INDIA, the
European Union, Mexico, and Canada. Id.
82. See Robert Guy Matthews, Trade Panel Rules for U.S. Steelmakers: Bush
Now Is Likely to Raise Big Hurdles for Imports, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2001, at A2
(discussing U.S. International Trade Commission's ("ITC") conclusion that the
domestic steel industry was indeed "seriously injured" by the influx of steel from
foreign markets since 1998). Anti-dumping and safeguard relief will be more
contentious, but the United States must emphasize that its companies, unions, and
communities deserve the support of the U.S. government. Certainly most U.S.
trade partners support their own industries. Of special significance in this regard is
the U.S. steel industry, which is vital for U.S. national security under Article XXI
of the GATT. Id. See also William R. Hawkins, Negotiating from Strength on
Trade, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Jan. 31, 2002 (examining possible U.S. reactions to
threats by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil to file complaints
with the WTO if the United States places high tariffs on steel imports), Joseph
Kahn, U.S. Trade Panel Backs Putting Hefty Duties on Imported Steel, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2001, at Cl (reporting the ITC's decision that increased tariffs on
steel imports as a necessary remedy to the market struggles of the U.S. domestic
steel producers); Robert Guy Mathews, The U.S. Won 't Take "No" For an Answver
at Paris Steel Summit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2001, at Al (predicting the likely
refusal by foreign steel producers to cut their production as was proposed by
President Bush and the possible consequences if such actions lead to a
confrontation between the United States and its allies); John D. Rockefeller IV,
Supporting American Steel, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at A17 (examining the
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Interestingly, the new Bush administration and USTR Robert
Zoellick have already implemented a broader trade negotiating
strategy. The United States now gives emphasis to three
simultaneous tracks for trade negotiations: (i) multilateral
negotiations and the WTO; (ii) regional negotiations and the Free
Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA); and, (iii) bilateral trade
relations. This is the only sensible option for U.S. trade policy. s3
current steel industry crisis and the need for government industry support such as
financial assistance and tariff protection). See also U.S. Senate Applies 'ressure on
Steel, GAZETA MERCANTIL ONLINE, Jan. 18, 2002 (stating the Senate's agreement
to wait until March 4, 2002 for a decision by President Bush on steel safeguards
before voting on TPA); Robert Guy Matthews & Geoff Winestock, EU Plan on
Steel Imports Gets Bush Veto, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2002, at A2 (discussing
President Bush's refusal to accept the EU proposal for bolstering the U.S. steel
industry). But see Peter Marsh, Steel Trade War MaY Yet be Averted, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2002, at 2 (proposing possible international mediation solutions that may
help avoid an international conflict over increased steel tariffs).
83. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 169-172 (1999) (explaining how the
use of bilateral trade agreements can facilitate cooperation within the international
marketplace and analyzing the benefits and drawbacks of such agreements). Many
countries, including the United States, European Union, Japan, and others, are
emphasizing bilateral "outreach" and "'maintenance" negotiations for trade,
finance, and security relationships. Bilateral dealings are also a better vehicle for
enforcing reasonable reciprocity and limiting "free rider" problems. Id. Zoelick
plans bilateral arrangement talks with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Central
America, and Africa. See also Andrew Bounds, The U.S. Takes Central America in
From the Cold, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at 10 (describing historic economic
struggles of Central American countries and recent efforts by the United States to
assist such struggles with free trade agreements); Raymond Colitt, EU Seeks to
Hasten Deal With Mercosur, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2002, at 10 (explaining that EU
officials hope to advance trade talks with Mercosur at a speed that will allow them
to reach an agreement prior to finalization of the Free Trade Agreement for the
Americas ("FTAA") planned for 2005); Edna Fernandes, India Faces Up to the
Economic Flip Side of China's W17O Enti3', FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at 5 (citing
the potential impact of China's membership in the W\rTO on its economic
relationship with India and both countries' hopes to enhance their bilateral trade
relationship); France to Assist Vietnam with W1,TO Entr, Bid, ASIA PULSE, Feb. 8,
2002 (reporting France's commitment to helping Vietnam join the WTO through
assistance programs); Saridet Marukatat, Bilateral Free Trade Pact With the U.S.
Considered, BANGKOK POST, Dec. 18, 2001 (discussing Thailand's possible
entrance into a free trade agreement with the United States and the potential impact
such agreement would have on both nations' economies); Mark Mulligan &Thierry
Ogier, Mercosur Bloc Sees Silver Lining for Region "s Trade, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2002, at 8 (reporting on hopes of Mercosur member states that the new president of
Argentina will refocus energies on creating a strong South American trade
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The United States must be prepared, if necessary, to exercise its
withdrawal rights under Article XV of the WTO Agreement.8 4 The
United States need only give six months notice for withdrawal, but
this is a serious step, requiring strong justification.85 Withdrawal
would signal to all U.S. trade partners that bilateral and regional
understandings would govern further trade access into U.S.
markets.86 Most countries will quickly accommodate and sign up for
environment); Louis Uchitelle, Argentina 's Woes May Strengthen Ties to Brazil,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at Cl (discussing how Argentina's decision to devalue
the peso instead of adopting the U.S. dollar could serve as a basis for increased
trade cooperation with Brazil); Andrew Ward, Seoul Cool on NEA Asian Trade
Zone Plan, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at 13 (reporting South Korea's declaration
that it hopes to increase trade cooperation with China and Japan, even though such
relationships may not rise to the level of NAFTA because of vast cultural
differences); Sri Lanka Seeks Preferential Trade Agreement with US, EU, XINIIUA
GEN. NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 1, 2002 (noting the plans of the Sri Lankan government
to seek a preferential trade agreement with the United States for its apparel and
textile industries), at www.xinhuanet.com. See generally TRANSATLANTIC
GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, ch. 1, 2, 8 & I l(Mark Pollack &
Gregory Shaffer eds., 2001) (discussing efforts by the United States and the
European Union to establish new forms of international governance to handle
increasing transatlantic and global interdependence and the problems associated
with such growing relationships); JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, PROSPECTS FOR FREE TRADE
IN THE AMERICAS (2001) (examining prospect for the FTAA in light of economic
and political turmoil in Latin America as well as obstacles facing U.S. fast-track
authority).
84. See GATT 1994, art. XV.
85. See id. at art. XV (allowing WTO withdrawal for any member after six
months notice to the Director General).
86. See generally LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note I, at 51-106
(providing a critical review of recent U.S. trade policies that have failed to enforce
sufficient reciprocity and overall trade balance). Lovett offers an alternative system
to promote a more realistic, balanced, and sustainable pattern of world trade
growth because the WTO, as presently constituted, is incapable of correcting the
four flaws stemming from the current WTO. Id.
The crucial problems are four-fold. First, there is a voting imbalance. Although
Article IX of the WTO Agreement expresses a desire for "consensus," it provides
clearly that if there is no consensus, then decision-making shall be by voting, i.e.,
one-country-one vote. Id. at 10. This framework gives the EU fifteen votes, plus
another ten to fifteen in additional EU member candidates (not to mention
approximately sixty Lom6 convention states with strong ties to the EU). Id. Russia
will have a group of former U.S.S.R. members under its influence, while China
and India (like most LDCs) have much less free trade obligation than OECD states.
Id. Japan is disadvantaged like the United States, but not to the same degree. A
new weighted voting system for the WTO comparable to the IMF is essential. Id.
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alternative arrangements. A convenient structure might be the
at 10-11. Second, entrenched asymmetries in access and tarifs characterize the
current WTO system. The United States is the most open major marketplace in the
world, but the EU and Japan are significantly less open. See LOVETT, U.S. TRADE
POLICY, supra note 1, at 140-41 (stating that Japan's trade remains "heavily
imbalanced" since the early 1980s and that many asymmetries still exist between
the European Union and the United States). Most NICs and LDCs still have
substantial tariffs and even greater access. Id. See also Alan W. Wolf, America's
Ability to Achieve Its Comnercial Objectives and the Operation of the WTO, 31
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1013, 1015 (2000) [hereinafter Wolf, America's Ability]
(evaluating the shortcomings of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and the
unwillingness of developing countries to live up to their commitments in world
trade). Third, the WTO results in structural U.S. trade and current account
deficits. U.S. trade and current account deficits increased substantially between the
early 1990s and 2000-2001. See Lovett, Train Wreck, supra note 2, at 411 (stating
that the WTO-Uruguay Round provided for substantially enlarged U.S. trade and
current account deficits during the 1990s and into 2000-2001). See also infra Table
1 and 2. These large external deficits are unsustainable and danger to the trade
flows of both the U.S. and its major trading partners. See LovETTr, U.S. TRADE
POLICY, supra note 1, at 141 (warning that if the United States continues a trend of
asymmetries that cause "structural" trade deficits, the "'inevitable conclusion will
be further erosion" to the United States' industrial, technological, and prosperity
foundations). Lastly, the WTO's dispute resolution process is unsatisfactory.
Litigious countries and the win/lose WTO dispute resolution process creates
contentious hardened trade conflicts. See Alan W. Wolf, Problems With VTO
Dispute Settlement, 2 CHI. J. INTr'L L. 417, 417-20 (2001) [hereinafter Wolf, WTO
Dispute Settlement] (outlining unintended consequences of a binding dispute
settlement and problems caused to the United States and other nations). Many
decisions seem unreasonable to the "losers." Id. In contrast, the prior GATT
dispute resolution process's emphasis on diplomacy, mediation, and conciliation
was largely successful. Criticism of the new WTO dispute resolution process stems
from excessive biases against workers, the environment, the United States, and for
favoring MNC's, and it is widening trade wars. See LOvETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY,
supra note 1, at 10-11, 102-03 (noting that the WTO's mandatory dispute
resolution process seemed to primarily serve the interests of MNCs, while the
United States and other agricultural exporters gained little in terms of market
access to Europe and Japan). Confidence in WTO dispute resolution is rapidly
eroding. See generally Wolf, WTO Dispute Settlement (specifying problems arising
out of the WTO's dispute settlement regime).
The U.S. has a strong record of encouraging freer trade in the post-World War
II era. See LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 4 (providing history and
background of the United States' movement toward freer trade). However, the
current WTO experiment is failing. See Lovett, Train Wreck, supra note 2, at 418-
19 (arguing that the GATT 1994-WTO has "'unwisely weakened U.S. industrial
safeguards, unfair practice remedies, and trade balance discipline). Simply put, the
current WTO structure is "bad architecture." See Lovett, Train Wreck, supra note
2, at 417 (describing the Uruguay Round, GATT 1994, and the WTO deals as
"badly designed architecture").
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following "A, B, C, D" tiered access to U.S. markets. First, "A
Class" countries with minimal tariffs and open capital markets would
enjoy minimal U.S. tariffs and restrictions. Most OECD countries fit
this framework already. Second, "B Class" countries would face
eight to ten percent U.S. tariffs. This would apply to nations using
ten to twenty percent average tariffs and somewhat restricted capital
markets. Third, "C Class" countries would face fifteen to twenty
percent U.S. tariffs. This would face nations with twenty-five to fifty
percent tariffs and substantial capital and intellectual property
restrictions. Fourth, "D Class" countries who now offer only very
limited access to their own markets with little or no opportunity for
capital flows and/or intellectual property protection countries would
face greatly restricted access to U.S. markets.
With this reciprocity-based ladder of conditional access to U.S.
markets, countries could choose the degree of openness they prefer
in trading with the United States, and vice versa. Special GSP
preferences could still be given to the poorest countries, i.e., those
not yet capable of handling more reciprocal trade with the U.S. and
other OECD nations. This new "A, B, C, D Class" System of
graduated access would solve the "free rider" and "asymmetry"
problems left uncorrected by the Tokyo GATT Round (1974-79) and
the Uruguay-WTO Round (1985-94). This class system would better
balance trade flows and provide for the elimination of the U.S.
"structural" trade and current account deficits after a few years. This
"A, B, C, D Class" System would greatly encourage more openness
among developing countries, unlike the present, locked-into-place,
asymmetrical WTO trade structure that perpetuates "free rider"
problems. 87
An interesting question is whether the United States should
consider WTO withdrawal and tougher trade bargaining in the early
stages of its new War on Terrorism and the WTO negotiating round
launched at Doha, Qatar in November 2001. Given the present
situation perhaps the United States should not consider these options
87. See J. Steven Jarreau, Interpreting the General Agreement on Trade in
Services and the WTO Instruments Relevant to the International Trade of
Financial Services: The Laiiyer's Perspective, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. I,
27-28 (1999) (explaining "free-rider" problems in Article 11 of the MFN principle
of the current WTO system).
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right away. The United States, however, should not subsidize a new
WTO round with costly one-way concessions any longer.sS In the
long run, U.S. partners in the global economy-security system should
carry their fair share of the load. Americans have carried heavier
defense burdens than most of their allies for fifty years (except for a
few nations with special vulnerability, e.g., Israel or South Korea.)
When the United States enjoyed substantially higher living standards
and an industrial lead, a policy of unequal trade openness seemed
acceptable.8 9 Now American tolerance for "free riding" and unequal
burden sharing is approaching its limits." U.S. trade bargaining in
the next WTO round should be more realistic and reciprocity
oriented.91
88. See Lovett, Train Wreck, supra note 2, at 417 (describing the shortcomings
and pitfalls arising out of the GATT 1994-WTO regime). The best way to phase in
the new trade policy and a broader, more equal, and free trade in the global
marketplace is an immediate, extended discussion of the basic shortcomings in the
current GATT 1994-WTO framework. The existing, badly imbalanced state of
affairs cannot last much longer. However, the new -A, B, C, D Class" tiered access
system would be a great improvement. Id.
89. See LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 4 (describing the
willingness of the United States to accept unequal reciprocal trade deals with
developing nations and other trading partners).
90. See Jarreau, supra note 87, at 25 (describing the "free-rider" problem of
those WTO members who made weak or no commitments to provide access to
their financial services markets).
91. See Ed Crooks, World News: G7 to Discuss Threat of Global Economic
Inbalances, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 15, 2000, at 7 (explaining that a warning
by the IMF that the United States' highly-valued stock market and consumer boom
could create dangerous imbalances, including a record-breaking trade deficit and
setting off a global recession). If the United States does not overhaul and correct
the current WTO unbalanced structure, U.S. trade and current account deficits will
probably get worse. See Wanted: S2 Billion a Day, ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 2002
(commenting that the U.S. external deficit cannot afford to continue to grow).
Until the stress of aggravated U.S. imbalances (excess imports with insufficient
exports) forces a major U.S. dollar devaluation, and more drastic, faster reductions
in U.S. imports (with counter-devaluations from desperate U.S. trade partners),
U.S. stock prices will fall substantially. Additionally, growing recession and
unemployment will afflict the United States and its major trade partners. d. In
these circumstances, healthy trade structure reform, and overhaul will be more
difficult. Significantly, increased protectionism and serious trade wars will follow
as in the 1930s. See, e.g., LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 63-73
(describing the era of American protectionism during the 1930s and efforts to
effect a general tariff revision). Even worse, as in the 1930s, damage to mutual
confidence among nations is likely with expanded risks of international conflict.
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Fortunately, the logjam of conflicting agendas and demands at
Doha gives a strong hint as to constraints and the limited "give" in
global trade arrangements. 9 NICs want more safeguard relief from
the advanced countries and each other, less risk to employment,
business potential, and growth prospects from the world market."
LDCs agree, but stress their lack of sufficient participation in recent
export expansion and foreign capital investments.94 On the other
hand, most advanced countries (like the United States, European
Union, and Japan) are conflicted. They seek expanded exports and
growth, but many domestic interests want to limit dislocations for
labor, business, and environmental progress. There is an erosion of
the faith that freer world markets guarantee good results. Most
nations represented at the Doha Ministerial have interests and sectors
that offer little room for additional concessions or risky openings,
except from other nations. Yet, MNC lobbies feel strongly that
protection of their opportunities is essential to prevent an unraveling
of global prosperity.95
IV. STRAINS IN THE FINANCE REGIME
Floating exchange rates, global capital markets, international
banking, and IMF stabilization assistance to countries suffering
balance of payments and adjustment problems are essential features
of international finance. In many ways, the finance system works
reasonably well. Financial market disciplines, reinforced by IMF
Id. See also LOVETT, INFLATION AND POLITICS, supra note 43, at 60-61 (discussing
economic decline in the 1930s).
92. See Lovett, Train Wreck, supra note 2, at 413 (stating that the WTO's
"logjam" of conflicting interests is better understood in the context of rival freer
trade outlooks competing in modem world politics).
93. See id. at 417 (commenting that NICs want to limit further trade opening
and increase safeguard relief).
94. See id. (describing the LDCs desire to cut back on safeguards to foreign
investors and to prevent financial crises and devaluations that undercut their gains
from expanding exports and manufacturing).
95. See id. at 415-16 (stating that MNC interest groups do not want to "rock tile
boat," and want to protect the entrenchment and extension of a global economy).
Overhaul of the present WTO system would better serve the MNC lobbies. MNC's
legitimate interests in a more stable, sustainable trade-finance system would be
better "protected" by timely overhaul and a clean reconstruction job for the world
trading system. Id.
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surveillance, force most countries to live within their means, and
they have worked since the 1980s to greatly reduce inflation in many
countries.96
IMF decision-making and conditionality disciplines evolved
during the 1950s and 1960s. The IMF's Executive Board established
weighted voting according to capitalization (overall size of
economies) early on.97 Super-majority requirements assure blocking
96. See LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 5 (stating that following
the Great Depression and early post-World War 11, most countries were forced to
"live within their means" and maintain current account discipline). See generally
CHARLES KINDLEBERGER, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE (2d ed.
1993) (surveying European financial history from earliest times to present);
CAIRNCROSS & EICHENGREEN, supra note 52 (describing the prevailing situation,
alternative policy options available, arguments for and against devaluation and
assessments of effects on prices, labor costs, money supply, and trade and payment
flows); HAROLD JAMES, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION SINCE
BRETTON WOODS 53-620 (1996) (providing a comprehensive account of the
management of the international monetary system from the 1944 Bretton Woods
conference to present day documents, including the structure and movements of
the world economy); PETER KENEN, THE INTrERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
ARCHITECTURE: WHAT'S NEW? WHAT'S MISSING (2001) (assessing efforts to
reduce the risk of future economic crises by increasing the availability of
information about economic conditions in emerging-market countries and
strengthening the financial systems of those countries); MANAGING TH4E WORLD
ECONOMY: FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS 341-95 (Peter Kenen ed., 1994)
(discussing the framework of international institutions that will be required to meet
challenges of the twenty-first century and how to adapt existing institutions and
build new institutions to ensure future prosperity and security); GERALD MEIER,
THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS: COMPETITION AND
GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1998) (providing a conceptual
framework for the managerial tasks of diagnosing; predicting, and responding to
changes in the world economy); R. TAGGART MURPHY, THE WEIGHT OF TIE YEN
41-319 (1997) (providing an analysis of America's troubled economic relationship
with Japan); FRANKLIN ROOT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT (Peter
Kenen ed., 7th ed. 1994) (covering issues of international trade, governmental
trade policies, international capital flows, and financial markets and governmental
macro policies affecting trade and capital flows among countries); GEORGE SOROS,
THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (1998) (explaining the
collapsed global economy and how theoretical assumptions have combined with
human behavior to lead to present day economic troubles).
97. See LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 173-77 (describing the
IMF's Executive Board structure and the weighted voting system). See also
JACKSON, supra note 31, at 96-98 (detailing the WTO's structure and voting
system and differences with IMF and World Bank that use a weighted voted
system).
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votes for both creditor countries and debtor nations, and for the
United States alone. Accordingly, IMF assistance is generally
available for most countries, but not too generously. Most IMF
assistance packages try to coordinate international bank financing
and continued access to global capital markets for other foreign
investments. Stretching out or rescheduling obligations provide a
means to deal with excess debt buildups. This preserves national
credit-worthiness and limits disruptive defaults or financial
breakdowns that could undermine later financial support and investor
confidence. Accordingly, assurance of the stability of global
financial obligations and international bank lending is possible.
Unfortunately, during the euphoria of the 1990s, excessive capital
inflows hit many emerging markets. Not surprisingly, these countries
welcomed the additional prosperity. Speculative excess and asset
bubbles, however, proved unsustainable in some countries. Nervous
domestic and foreign investors soon thereafter reversed net capital
flows, greatly shrinking foreign exchange reserves. In many of these
emerging market countries large current account deficits
accumulated when their governments became dependent upon net
foreign capital inflows to sustain their economies. When confidence
broke down, currency devaluation, banking crises, capital flight, and
disruptive recessions often followed.98
98. See generally BARRY HERMAN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL TURMOIL AND
REFORM: A UNITED NATIONS PERSPECTIVE (1999) (summarizing Asia's financial
and economic crisis and outlining a set of recommendations to strengthen the
capacity of developing and transitional economies and to reduce risks posed by the
current international financial system); PAUL R. KRUGMAN, CURRENCIES ANt)
CRISES (1998) (discussing international monetary economics in the context of the
past twenty years); PAUL R. KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS
(1999) (discussing six Asian economies following an economic slump that bears
resemblance to the Great Depression); RETHINKING THE EAST ASIAN MIRACL'
(Joseph Stiglitz & Shahid Yusuf eds., 2001) (detailing perspectives and potential
remedies on key facets of the East Asian economies including: weaknesses in the
financial sector, corporate governance, exchange rates, trade policies, and
regulatory capability). See also Robert Dunn, The Routes to Contagion,
CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec. 2001 (recounting the story of Argentina's economic rise
and fall, from an economic darling of emerging market investors to economic
disaster, and an explanation of how even the best-intentioned market reforms can
miss their mark), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/
Pastorl l0l.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2002). See generally MALAYSIAN ECLIPSE:
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND RECOVERY 1-256 (Jomo K.S. ed., 2001) [hereinafter
MALAYSIAN ECLIPSE] (examining the Malaysian economic crisis of 1997-1998);
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Lessons drawn from these recent financial crises reflect the need
for more care and caution in global finance. There is a distinct need
for improved transparency, higher quality accounting, and more
investor prudence. Strengthening banking and insurance company
regulation requires stronger capital requirements, tough prudential
supervision, and closure before insolvency. Securities and Exchange
Commission-type securities disclosure and regulation is also
necessary for all countries seeking investment from global capital
markets. Furthermore, improved business bankruptcy laws and
administration (like Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings in the United
States) must be fashioned to assure more efficient salvage for
distressed business-industrial enterprises."
ALISON HARWOOD ET AL., FINANCIAL MARKETS AND DEVELOPMENT': THE CRISIS
IN EMERGING MARKETS 1-413 (1999) (explaining that many countries that suffered
during the East Asian financial crisis borrowed from international debt markets but
ran semi-controlled local financial sectors).
99. See generally BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD NEW FINANCIAL
ARCHITECTURE: A PRACTICAL POST-ASIA AGENDA (1999) (discussing the Asian
financial crisis and the global economic turmoil that followed, as well as solutions
to similar problems should they occur). See also Report of an Independent Task
Force: Safeguarding Prosperi , in a Global Financial System The Future
International Financial Architecture (Oct. 1999) (Council on Foreign Relations)
IE (focusing problems in the existing architecture and offering recommendations
to place more responsibility on emerging economies themselves and their private
creditors), available at http://-wvw.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr2l/ (last visited Mar. 8,
2002). See generally ROBERT. A. BLECKER, TAMING GLOBAL FINANCE: A BETTER
ARCHITECTURE FOR GROWTH AND EQUITY (1999) (surveying the emerging debate
regarding the global financial system and providing evaluations of policy options
for reforming the system); SHAPING A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
CHALLENGES OF GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (Karl Keiser et al., eds.,
2001) (outlining globalization, governance, and challenges to creating a new
international finance system); JOHN WILLIAMSON, THE CRAWLING BAND AS AN
EXCHANGE RATE REGIME: LESSONS FROM CHILE, COLOMBIA, AND ISRAEL (1996)
(examining the successful experiences of three countries that recently operated
exchange rate systems of "crawling bands"): WORLD BANK, FINANCE FOR
GROWTH (2001) (distilling policy lessons from the vast and growing empirical
literature on financial crises and development). But see WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE
EXCLUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS' MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS
(2001) (finding no empirical support for traditional presumptions that foreign aid
increases investment, that high investment ratios lead to higher growth, or that
education, population control, and debt relief will stimulate growth); PAUL
BLUSTEIN, THE CHASTENING, INSIDE THE CRISIS THAT ROCKED TIlE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND HUMBLED THE IMF (2001) (demonstrating both the
narrowness of the IMF's philosophical approach and the gross inadequacy of its
economic arsenal); EDWARD LINCOLN, ARTHRITIC JAPAN: THIE SLOW PACE OF
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In some countries, restrictions are appropriate to limit excess
capital inflows and inhibit speculative "bubbles." Whether it is
possible to engineer limits on capital flight for countries under strain
is more doubtful. If business confidence is breaking down, capital
flight and devaluation are hard to avoid. While failing governments
normally try to "keep the lid on" a little while longer, these efforts
are merely a warning to "head for the exit." The global economy
cannot currently support many such naive investors and
companies.100
Exchange rate regimes are a crucial variable. Reasonable
flexibility with floating potential seems necessary for most countries.
Rigid pegging or fixed rate regimes are vulnerable to stress, eroded
confidence, and periodic breakdown (except for little countries or
island states that are closely linked in trade-investment flows to
major nations such as the United States, European Union, United
Kingdom, etc.). Adoption of a major country's currency can work for
such nearby satellite states. The recent stress on Argentina's
"dollarization" policy, however, illustrates serious difficulties for
larger countries in simply adopting a distant country's currency with
no close linkage in trade or investment flows.
Resurgent budget deficits and inflation pressures for Argentina,
combined with a slowdown and increased unemployment,
undermined confidence in the Argentine Currency Board and its
dollarization program, which collapsed in political crisis late in
2001.101
ECONOMIC REFORM (2001) (warning that fundamental aspects of Japan's economic
system are not changing significantly and prolonged weakness in the Japanese
economy could have serious negative consequences for U.S. foreign policy and
trade). See generally KENEN, supra note 96 (determining causes of previous
financial crises and offering solutions for prevention in the future); RYOICIII
MIKITANI & ADAM POSEN, JAPAN'S FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE PARALLELS TO
U.S. EXPERIENCE (2000) (comparing the response of Japanese policy in the 1990s
to that of the U.S. monetary and financial policy and the American Savings and
Loan crisis of the late 1980s).
100. See generally MALAYSIAN ECLIPSE, supra note 98, at 1-256 (examining the
Malaysian economic crisis of 1997-1998); see also. Alex Berenson, Oversight: The
Biggest Casualty of Enron's Collapse: Confidence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at
1 (describing the impact on investors and worldwide corporations following the
collapse of Enron).
101. See generally Interview with Lance Taylor, Argentina: A Poster Child /br
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A dangerous problem remains for the poorest countries that often
lack adequate infrastructure, secure property, market institutions, and
government competence. These countries often feel left out in the
march of economic progress. Many suffer because repressive
governments do not feel much responsibility to their peoples beyond
political sloganeering. The most tragic situations involve grievously
"failed" states, where barbarism, vicious civil wars, or thuggery has
taken over a people or an area (like Liberia, Rwanda, Zaire, or Sierra
Leone). Unfortunately, failed states present urgent security problems
that often spill over into their neighbors or even more widely in the
world community. With light arms, explosives, rockets, and other
weapons readily available (often supplied by outside terrorist or
the Failure of Liberalized Policies, CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 28-44,
available at http://www.mesharpe.com/cha_4406.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2002);
see also Larry Rohter, Argentina Paying Heavily for Squandering Blessings, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al (describing the economic plight of Argentina and loss
of confidence in political and social institutions); Argentina 's Bank Chief Forced
to Quit, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at 1 (reporting resignation of Argentina's
central bank chief due to pressures imposed on the government to overthrow bank
controls); Thomas CatAn & Mark Mulligan, Argentina Set for Devaluation of the
Peso, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2002, at 8 (reporting Argentina's president's decision to
devalue the peso by thirty to forty percent as part of an emergency plan to restore
order to the country's economic situation); Pamela Druckerman, Investors' in
Argentina Fell Burned By the Big Banks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001, at A14
(stating that foreign investors hold S95 million of Argentina's S132 billion debt);
Sebastian Edwards, A Simple Answer for Argentina: Follow Chile s Erample,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002, at A19 (suggesting that Argentine President Duhalde
take a lesson from Chile's economic crisis of 1982 when the Chilean peso was
devalued by seventy-eight percent); Paul Krugman, Crying Wlith Argentina, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at A21 (commenting on the causes of Argentina's economic
slump); Marc Lifsher, As Argentina Teeters, the Ecuadorean Success Stor' Looms,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001, at A14 (reporting that Ecuador's decision to replace
the sucre with the U.S. dollar helped to revitalize the economy, a reform that might
similarly benefit hard-pressed Argentina); Amity Shlaes, The Argentine Peso
Holds Lessons for the Euro: It is Dangerous to Elevate a Currenci as a Political
Emblem if the Need for Other Economic Reforms is Obscured, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2002, at 19 (raising issues regarding economic reforms in Argentina and dangers
associated with elevating a currency as a political emblem); Martin Wolf,
Argentina's Agonising Options: Confidence in the Peso Has Gone: The
Government Needs to Answer Si& Questions Before Deciding the Net Step, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at 21 (speculating on Argentina's next step as the government
imposes restrictions on withdrawals from banks and on access to dollars for
international transactions); Martin Wolf, Duhalde Pledges to Work with IMF, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at 1 (commenting on President Eduardo Duhalde's decision
to work with the IMF on an economic plan).
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criminal organizations), these problems are not financial. For
example, the current problems of Afghanistan, after a ten-year war
against Russian intervention and civil wars following, led to the
ascendancy of the Taliban. Even decent, well-governed countries
with sound economic policies are vulnerable to this manner of attack
and destabilization. Sadly, as the world learned in the mid-to-late
1930s, there is no substitute for timely, effective, and courageous
collective security measures. 02  When rogue states, fanatical
terrorists, or irresponsible thugs gain momentum and intimidate
peaceful countries, the destabilization of healthy trade-finance in
many nations is likely.1
0 3
102. See generally HENRY D. SOKOLSKI, BEST OF INTENTIONS: AMERICA'S
CAMPAIGN AGAINST STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROLIFERATION (2001) (relating the
history of nonproliferation and relating it to present day problems such as
horizontal proliferation); RICHARD N. HAASS, THE RELUCTANT SHERIFF: THE
UNITED STATES AFTER THE COLD WAR 103-34 (1997) (proposing that the United
States adopt a foreign policy based on the notion of regulation where countries
settle disputes peacefully and governments act more responsibly toward their own
citizens and neighbors); DONALD KAGAN & FREDERICK W. KAGAN, WHILE
AMERICAN SLEEPS: SELF-DELUSION, MILITARY WEAKNESS, AND THE TIIREAT TO
PEACE TODAY (2000) (arguing for a necessary change to preserve peace and
security in the United States); JANNE E. NOLAN, AN ELUSIVE CONSENSUS:
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AMERICAN SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR (1999)
(analyzing the contemporary U.S. security debate based on utility and missions of
nuclear weapons after the Cold War); PRESENT DANGERS: CRISIS AND
OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY (Robert Kagan &
William Kristol eds., 2000) (describing emerging dangers to American peace
established at the end of the Cold War and a call for foreign policy of "benevolent
hegemony" as a means to secure peace and advance American interests and
principles around the world); THE EMERGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT:
CHALLENGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Williamson Murray ed., 1999)
(addressing fundamental issues of emerging strategic environments in Europe and
the Middle East and its strategic problems).
103. See generally A CENTURY'S JOURNEY: HOW THE GREAT POWERS SIIAPE
THE WORLD (Robert A. Pastor ed., 1999) (analyzing the international system in the
twentieth century in an effort to understand the twenty-first century); MICHAEL
SHEEHAN, BALANCE OF POWER: HISTORY & THEORY (1996) (examining guiding
principles behind international politics and history of the balance of power system
since the eighteenth century). See also LOVETT, U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra note 1,
at 172-82 (discussing trade imbalances challenging America's role in the global
economy).
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TABLE 1
U.S. GNP, DEBT, AND EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS
1961-2001 (IN BILLIONS OF U.S. S)'O
Year GNP Gross Merchand. Merchand. Merchand. Current Customs Customb
Fed'! Imports' Exports1 6  Trade Acc't Value Value




1961 520.1 292.6 14.8 20.2 5.5 3.8 5.5 3.8
1962 560.3 302.9 16.5 21.0 4.5 3.4 4.5 3.4
1963 590.5 310.3 17.2 22.5 5.3 4.4 5.3 4.4
1964 632.4 316.1 18.7 25.8 7.1 6.8 7.1 6.8
1965 684.9 322.3 21.4 26.7 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.4
1966 749.9 328.5 25.6 29.5 3.9 3.0 3.9 3.0
1967 793.9 340.4 28.7 30.0 1.3 -0.3 4.1 2.6
1968 865.0 368.7 35.3 34.1 -1.3 -1.5 0.8 0.6
1969 930.3 365.8 38.2 37.3 -0.9 -1.8 1.3 0.4
1970 977.1 380.9 42.4 42.7 0.2 -0.1 2.7 2.3
1971 1,054.9 408.2 48.3 43.5 -4.8 .4.2 -2.0 -1.4
1972 1,158.0 435.9 58.9 49.2 -9.7 -9.8 -5.7 -5.8
104. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Accounts Data, available
at http://www.fedstats.gov/index20.html; U.S. Council of Economic Advisors,
Economic Indicators, various issues 1965-2001; Economic Report of thePresident,
1982, 1984, 1986, 1997, and 2001.
105. Merchandise imports are based on cost-insurance-freight (-C.I.F.") values.
However, C.I.F. figures are not available from 1961-1966. Those imports are
based on census values. C.I.F. figures from 1967-1973 are based on estimates.
106. Exports are based on free-along-side ("F.A.S.") value.
107. Current account balance reflects the net balance on merchandise trade,
services trade, investment income, and other unilateral transfers. However, the
years 1961-1964 only show the results of merchandise imports, exports, services,
and income from investments.
108. Annual rate, seasonally adjusted.
109. Quarterly rate, not seasonally adjusted.
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Year GNP Gross Merchand. Merchand. Merchand. Current Customs Customs
Fed' Imports Exports Trade Acc't Value Value
Debt Balance Balance Trade Current
Balance Acc't
Balance
1973 1,294.9 466.3 73.6 71.9 -1.7 3.1 2.4 7.1
1974 1,397.4 483.9 110.9 99.4 -11.5 -5.6 -3.9 2.0
1975 1,528.8 541.9 105.9 108.9 3.0 11.5 9.6 18.1
1976 1,700.1 629.0 132.5 116.8 -15.7 -3.6 -7.8 4.3
1977 1,887.2 706.4 160.4 123.2 -37.2 -23.1 -28.4 -14.3
1978 2,156.1 776.6 186.0 145.8 -40.2 -25.1 -30.2 -15.1
1979 2,413.9 829.5 222.2 186.4 -35.8 -12.2 -23.9 -0.3
1980 2,626.1 909.1 257.0 225.7 -31.3 -9.2 -19.7 2.3
1981 2,957.8 994.8 273.4 238.7 -34.7 -7.3 -22.3 5.0
1982 3,069.3 1.137.3 254.9 216.4 -38.4 -22.4 -27.5 -11.4
1983 3,304.8 1,371.7 269.9 205.6 -64.2 -54.0 -54.2 -44.0
1984 3,772.2 1,564.7 346.4 224.0 -122.4 -114.6 -106.7 -99.0
1985 4,010.3 1,817.5 352.5 218.8 -133.6 -139.9 -117.7 -124.0
1986 4,235.0 2,120.6 382.3 227.2 -155.1 -170.0 -138.3 -153.2
1987 4,545.6 2,346.1 424.4 254.1 -170.3 -186.3 -152.1 -168.1
1988 5,062.6 2,601.3 460.2 321.8 -138.4 -148.1 -118.5 -128.2
1989 5,452.8 2,868.0 487.6 363.8 -123.7 -118.6 -109.4 -104.2
1990 5,764.9 3,026.6 512.5 393.6 -119.0 -109.1 -101.7 -91.9
1991 5,932.4 3,598.5 504.4 421.7 -82.6 -14.2 -74.1 -5.7
1992 6,255.5 4,002.1 546.0 448.2 -97.9 -58.1 -96.1 -56.4
1993 6,666.7 4,351.4 597.4 465.1 -132.3 -90.5 -132.6 -90.8
1994 7,071.1 4,643.7 689.2 512.6 -176.6 -143.9 -166.2 -133.5
1995 7,420.9 4,920.9 770.9 582.1 -188.8 -144.4 -173.6 -129.1
1996 7,831.2 5,181.9 817.8 622.8 -195.0 -152.0 -191.2 -148.2
1997 8,305.0 5,369.7 898.3 687.6 -210.7 -178.1 -199.0 -166.4
1998 8,750.0 5,478.7 942.6 682.1 -260.5 - 229.8 -220.6
1999 9,236.2 5,606.1 1,059.9 695 -364.9 - -330.0 -331.5
2000 9,700(e) 5,686 1,259.3 781.9 -415.9 - -380.5 -447.7
2001 10,120(e) 5,772(e) 1,207(e) 756(e) -459(e) - -426(e) -426(c)
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TABLE 2
U.S. EXPORTS, IMPORTS, AND TRADE BALANCE
BY COUNTRY AND AREA, NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED,
2001 (IN BILLIONS OF SU.S.)" 0
Trade
Countries Balance Exports Imports Imports
or areas (Customs (F.A.S.) (Customs (C.I.F.(Cums Basis) Basis)Imports)
N. America] 11  -77.4 246.5 323.9 328.1
W. Europe -60.1 161.4 221.5 227.8
Euro Area -50.4 102.8 153.2 157.6
EFTA Area -3.2 11.1 14.3 14.7
E. Europe 112  -6.9 6.3 13.3 14.0
Former USSR -3.9 3.8 7.7 8.1
Pacific Rim -181.4 167.2 348.6 363.7
Asia Near -16.3 17.7 34.0 36.1
East
AsianNICsn 3  -19.7 66.7 86.4 89.5
Asia-South -11.1 4.3 15.5 16.4
ASEAN -29.4 40.0 69.4 72.4
APEC -270.3 426.6 696.8 717.7
110. Sources: www.census.gov/foreign-trade: www.press.htnil.
111. Canada and Mexico.
112. Includes the former U.S.S.R.
113. Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.
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Counries Trade
Countries Balance Exports Imports Imports
or areas (Customs (F.A.S.) (Customs (C.1.F.
(mpotts Basis) Basis)Imports)
South and
Central -8.6 54.1 62.7 66.7
America
114
NATO Allies -106.6 309.1 415.7 424.6
OPEC -37.7 18.5 56.2 60.3
114. Includes Caribbean Basin Countries.





Exports 1,192.2 1,232.4 1,418.6 1,350(e)
Goods"16  670.2 684.4 772.2 744(e)
Services 263.7 271.9 293.5 290(e)
Income 258.3 276.2 352.9 316(e)
Receipts
Imports -1,368.7 -1,515.9 -1,809.1 -1,734(e)
Goods -917.2 -1,029.9 -1,224.4 -1,186(e)
Services -181.0 -191.3 -217.0 -208(e)
Income
Payments -270.5 -294.6 -367.7 -331 (e)
Unilateral -44.1 -48.0 -54.1 -52(e)
Transfers
115. Source: Surey of Current Business. April 2000, April 2001, and January
2002.
116. Balance of payments basis (using customs value imports, and not C.I.F., for
imports).
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TABLE 3
U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS,
1998-2001 (BILLIONS OFS U.S.)" 5
1001
1999 1 2000 1 2001
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.





U.S. Assets -292.8 -430.2 -581.0 -480(e)Abroad
Foreign 502.6 753.6 1,024.2 888(e)
Assets in U.S.
BALANCE
ONCN -220.6 -331.5 -444.7 -426(e)CURRENT
ACCOUNT
NET
FINANCIAL 209.8 323.4 443.3 400(e)
FLOWS
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